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Summary 
 
This paper describes and analyses trends and patterns of migration from Iraq with a 
focus on the movement of those Iraqis who migrated from their country between the 
Gulf War in 1990-1991 and the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in April 2003. The 
conceptual frame of migration orders is used however combined with approaches 
proposed by social geography and social anthropology. The first part describes and 
analyses the dynamics, flows, directions, poles and sociological features of Iraqi 
emigration in before the 1991-1991 Gulf war. The focus of the second part is on how 
regional and global trends of Iraqi migration were reshaped between the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the end of 2002. The last part looks as a series of 
social variables relevant in the regional context of migration and in Iraq. The paper 
discussed the relevance of distinguishing between the political and economic causes 
of emigration; argues that a combination between forced migration and collective 
dynamics characterises the post-Gulf war Iraqi order; and evaluates the role of 
migrants' social networks. Migration trends between 1990 and 2003 are shown to be 
partially embedded in previous trends, whereas the new migration order that 
emerged from embargoed Iraq is argued to have launched long-lasting and far-
ranging collective migration dynamics. 
 
Keywords: Iraq, migration, refugees, migration order, social networks. 
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Post-2003 forced-migration from Iraq is the focus of a growing litterature, mostly 
produced by organisations that specialise in advocacy or assistance to refugees, with 
yet limited instances of scholarly interest (Chatelard and Dorai 2009; Marfleet 2007; 
Sassoon 2008). The dominant tendency is to view the post-2003 trend as a major 
forced-migration or refugee 'crisis' thus positing a rupture in the Iraqi migration order. 
The profound political and economic changes that Iraq has undergone since the 
Anglo-American invasion and the fall of the Ba'athist regime in April-May 2003, with 
heightened and new levels of human insecurity, have undeniably affected dynamics 
of emigration from Iraq. However, the scarcity of scholarly material on migration 
mouvements from Iraq in the period before 2003, and the construction of subsequent 
migratory trends as an “unprecedented refugee crisis”, have largely obscured the 
question of the embededness of the recent migration in previous sociological and 
spatial dynamics in a country where large-scale emigration mouvements can be 
traced back to the 1920s, ie the early years of the inception of the modern state, with 
several episodes in the following decades.  
 
The objective of this paper is to document and analyse these trends and patterns 
from a sociohistorical and sociospatial perspective with a focus on the movement of 
those Iraqis who migrated from their country between the Gulf War in 1990-1991 and 
the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in April 2003. Over that period, large numbers of 
Iraqis started launching asylum claims in liberal countries of the north to the point that 
human rights and refugee organisations listed Iraq as one of the major refugee 
producing countries in the world (AI 1997; UNHCR 1996). The main question that 
guides this paper his how the Iraqi migration order responded to the profound 
political and economic transformations that affected Iraq in the last phase of the 
Ba'athist regime: after eight years of war with Iran (1980-1988), the country's position 
within the regional and global political and economic orders further shifted towards 
isolation; the regime became more authoritarian and political coercition more 
systematic and violent towards specific social groups; the sanctions imposed by the 
UN Security Council as of 1990 in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
impoverished the mass of the population while reinforcing the grip of the regime on 
the society. While incentives to leave Iraq were increasing for larger numbers of 
Iraqis, their mouvements were constrained by the policy choices of the Iraqi state vis-
à-vis emigration of its nationals and by those of state actors in the countries 
neighbouring Iraq and further afield vis-à-vis immigrants in general, and Iraqis in 
particular. However, it is posited here that trends during these twelve years were also 
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embedded in previous histories of migration, which are sketched in the first section of 
this paper, drawing from sparse secondary litterature, and pending systematic 
historical research that is direly lacking. Concluding remarks attempt to draw together 
the various elements to reach an understanding of the specificities of the new Iraqi 
migration order that was reshaped during the years 1990 to early 2003.  
  
Primary data for this paper were gathered through field-based research undertaken 
between 1998 and 2008 among Iraqi migrant communities in several countries 
(initially in Jordan and subsequently in Iran, Syria, France, Italy, the UK, Denmark, 
Pakistan and Yemen) using a combination of ethnographic and sociological 
approaches. Over 300 Iraqi individuals or families under different legal statuses were 
interviewed in a semi-structured way in the different sites, but many more informal 
discussions and field-notes taken while doing participant observation also provide the 
background for this paper. Fifteen individuals or families, encountered at different 
times and in different locations, became privileged informants with whom internet and 
telephone communication was mantained over several months to several years in 
view of documenting their migration trajectories and current and past histories. 
Interviews were also conducted with officials and staff of international organisations, 
NGOs, or foreign embassies, at times through internet communication with countries 
where field-work could not be undertaken (in particular with UNHCR officials in Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesia)
1
. Most of the social networks of migrants which are discussed 
in this paper were initially encountered through field-work in Jordan. Due to this 
methodological bias, the case of Iraqi Kurds, who did not migrate to Jordan in 
numbers, is only addresses marginally and mainly through secondary litterature.  
What started as an empirical research in Jordan and later Iran and Europe on the 
migration dynamics of Iraqis informed by the novel approach suggested by studies 
on migrant networks and transnationalism (Crisp 1999a; Ebaugh and Saltzman 
Chafetz, 2002; Faist, 2000; Gurak and Caces, 1992) came to face the need of a 
                                                   
1
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French Institute for the Near East (IFPO). Thanks are also due to Ségolène Barbou des Places for her legal insights 
and to France Métral, Elizabeth Picard and Didem Danis for their critical comments. An earlier version of this paper 
was published in French as  « L’émigration des Irakiens de la guerre du Golfe à la guerre d’Irak (1990-2003) »,  in H. 
Jaber et F. Métral (eds.) Mondes en mouvements. Migrants et migrations au Moyen-Orient au tournant du XXième 
siècle, IFPO, Beyrouth, pp.113-155, 2005. Helen Lackner was instrumental in translating this earlier paper into 
English.   
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broader conceptual frame that could allow to bring into the analysis several other 
levels of determinants and variables that appeared, as data was collected and 
complex trajectories of migrants were deployed over time and space, to shape 
migration patterns of a global scope. Such determinants and variables were bilateral 
and multilateral relations between states and their impact on migration regimes 
(Hollifield, 2000), the political and policy context of refugee mouvements and 
reception (Zolberg et al. 1989; Keely, 1996), but also the development of migrant 
smuggling organisations (Ghosh, 1998), and all the changing relations between 
these factors that kept reshaping contexts of opportunities for Iraqis engaged in 
migration projects, and hence the patterns of their mouvements.  
 
The integrative approach proposed by Kritz et al. (1992) in terms of migration 
systems that encompass the various macro (political and economic), meso 
(sociological) and micro (decision-making) levels, the spatial and temporal 
dimensions, and various levels of linkages seemed appropriate. However, Nicolas 
Van Hear, in his work on the new diasporas, has pointed at the shortcomings of the 
systems perspective on migration as being too functionalist and intended primarily to 
be a model of economic migration (Van Hear 1998: 17-18). He proposed instead an 
approach in terms of “migration orders” that encompasses models of forced 
migratory mouvements. The concept of “migration order” seems more suited to the 
case of migration trends from Iraq where succession of conflicts, ruptures in the 
territorial continuity and the political order, and the prevalence of migratory 
mouvement under constraint have regularly affected patterns of outmigration.  
 
Nevertheless, several constants have remained in the sociological profile of the 
migrants and in the regional and global patterns of their migration over time and 
space. To be able to account for them, but also for the emergence of new spatial and 
temporal trends based on specific sociological features, we have combined to the 
migration order framework two other sets of approaches and conceptual tools. On 
the one hand, following on the work of French social geographer and migration 
scholar Gildas Simon (1995; 2006), this paper places emphasis on the spacial and 
territorial dimensions of international migration by considering the relationship of 
migrants to physical, social political and ideal spaces, the social practices developed 
throughout transnational spaces, and the global architecture of identities within 
different geographical scales. Such notions as circulations, poles where migrants 
regroup, and staging points on the migratory routes are used to map this global 
6 
 
architecture and its dynamics and are widely used in this paper. A final level of 
analysis concerns the role in the migration dynamics of Iraqis of  so-called “primorial” 
ties relevant in the Middle Eastern context - ie those based on kinship, ethno-
linguistic and religious identities- that operate withing common social spaces of 
identification as historical and political constructs (Eickelman, 1981) and have to be 
accounted for not only at the level of the social groups bounded by these identities 
but also as “forces of regionalism” in the shaping of transnational migratory 
mouvement (Shami 1996). To balance the risk of an excessive “communalist” view of 
Iraqi migration dynamics, due consideration will be given to the “class” (in the 
Bourdieusian term) dimensions of Iraqi international migration, here again following 
Van Hear (2004).  
  
This paper does not purport however to validate or invalidate existing theories but 
merely to test the appropriateness of a number of conceptual tools and theoretical 
models to the case of migration mouvements from Iraq. The main aim is to come to 
an understanding of an Iraqi migration order in the period under consideration, with 
an evaluation of longer-term invariants and the appearance of new trends.  
 
1. Before the Gulf war 
 
It is relatively easy to map the migration patterns of Iraqis prior to the Gulf war, to 
locate the main geographical poles, and identify temporalities and directions of 
movements. It is, by contrast far more challenging to make a distinction between long 
and short term migration, or to clearly distinguish between the respective roles of 
economic factors or the political, ideological or religious causalities of these 
movements. It is equally difficult to separate cross-border family strategies from 
those which have an international scope
2
 or to clearly distinguish migratory dynamics 
which are family-based from those which concern larger social units but which 
operate at the family level. On this last point, there is a risk of giving too much weight 
to the role of religious or ethnic affiliations in the migratory process. The points made 
                                                   
2
  The expression “international migration” is used here in its strict acception as defining migration between 
states and not only south-north migratory movements. 
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above are of equal relevance to the different regional
3
 flows as they are to 
intercontinental flows, which must be seen as both distinct and interrelated. 
1.1 The regional level 
 
At the end of the 1980s, the majority of Iraqi who had left their country in the previous 
couple of decades were in Iran. The Ba'athist regime had, in a number of episodes 
since the late 1960s, expelled to that country half a million Iraqi nationals on the 
basis of their being of Iranian stock. This movement primarily concerned urban Shi’ite 
religious and economic elites and members of the middle-class whom the regime 
considered a threat to the consolidation of its power and who, in many cases, had no 
family links to Iran, including Shi'ite Kurds, some of them of rural background 
(Babakhan, 1994 and 2002; Makiya, 1989: 135-136; Vanly, 2002). Iran granted 
Iranian citizenship to some 100,000 expellees who could prove their Iranian origins. 
The others were received as refugees (panahandegan) with state protection and 
social benefits – including the right to work – that facilitated their long term socio-
economic integration at a time when there was no likelihood of their being able to 
return to Iraq. Despite this, these refugees remained stateless and without the 
possibility of claiming Iranian naturalisation (Luizard, 2002 : 268-269; Rajaee, 2000: 
44-63). During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) expellees were joined by supporters of 
the Iranian revolution, deserters from the army and refugees from the fighting zones 
as well as several waves of rural Kurds driven out by Iraqi military and quasi-
genocidal campaigns (al-Anfal in particular) (Picard, 1991), very few of whom 
returned to Iraq where they had no guarantee for their safety. These refugee 
movements were articulated around, or superimposed upon, ancient cross-border 
movements based on commercial, religious, political and family dynamics, as well as 
connected to Iranian emigrants to Iraq who had settled over generations. However, 
the Iraq-Iran war interrupted most of these exchanges and the border between the 
two countries remaining closed after the end of the conflict. This reduced human 
mobility but did however allow conditional crossings to Iran mostly for religious 
purposes in addition to occasional military infiltrations in both directions, as well as 
exchanges of prisoners. (Interviews, Khouzestan and Teheran, 2002). 
 
                                                   
3
  The regional dimension of Iraqi migration is not framed arbitrarily but is based on the identification of time-
frames and scales of migratory mouvements specific to a geographical area that extents from Pakistan to Libya and 
includes Arab countries of the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula, together with Turkey and Iran.  
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Iraq’s oil based economy had turned the country into a major importer of Arab labour 
since the 1970s, a trend that accelerated during the Iran-Iraq war. Most of these 
emigrants were Egyptian, but there were also Palestinians, Sudanese and Yemenis. 
By contrast, only a few thousands highly educated Iraqis migrated to Arab states in 
search of employment. They were concentrated in oil-producing countries – such as 
Libya, Algeria or the Gulf monarchies (Al-Nouri, 1996; Luizard, 2002: 231), but also in 
Yemen where there was a demand for qualified professionals (interviews, San'a, 
2006). However employment was rarely the main motive for the movement of Iraqis 
to other Arab states; reasons for leaving were political or ideological, and at times 
ethno-religious. In some cases, the existence of cross-border social groups (such as 
Shi'ites in Kuwait) was a determinant of migration.  
 
In Damascus, a community of residents of Iraqi origin - mostly Sh'ite expellees of the 
1970s and 1980s who had lived initially in Iran -  had settled around the tombs of 
members of Prophet Mohammed's family and companions which were the foci of 
pilgrimage for the Shi'ites; the settlers continued to maintain links with Iraq through 
the movements of pilgrims (Adelkhah, 1996). Syria was an axis for trade, religious 
and political connections with Iran which was particularly important at times when 
direct communication between Iraq and Iran was not officially allowed. Early 20
th
 
Century history had also led to the establishment in Syria of centres for the Assyrian 
and Chaldean Christian communities
4
: thanks to inter marriages, these centres 
(Damascus, Aleppo and Hassakeh) continued to develop through the arrival of co-
religionists from Iraq (Yacoub, 1986). Finally Damascus was the base for several 
opposition movements, Kurdish nationalist and others, to the Iraqi regime (Luizard, 
2002: 209, 232;  interviews, Syria, 2003). 
 
Jordan had welcomed members of the Hashemites dynasty and those of their 
associates who survived the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. From the 
1960s to the 1980s Amman received opponents to the Iraqi republican and 
subsequently Ba'athist regimes. Iraqi private sector entrepreneurs, themselves often 
closely associated with political émigrés and their descendants (to whom Jordan had 
granted residence rights and sometimes citizenship), used Amman as a base for 
their regional activities and for wider international strategies. This was the case 
particularly when the Jordanian capital took over some of the Lebanese banking 
                                                   
4
  Assyrian Christians are separated between the autonomous Assyrian Church of the East and the Catholic 
Chaldean Church, the latter united with Rome and generally referred to as the Chaldeans.  
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activities after the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. The border between Iraq 
and Jordan was open and allowed the passage of men, goods and of significant 
capital in both directions (Fattah 2007; interviews, Jordan 2001-2009). 
 
With respect to both Syria and Jordan, estimates of the number of Iraqi residents just 
before the 1990 invasion of Kuwait is complicated by the fact that some of the 
migrants belonged to the second or third generation since departure from Iraq and 
that many had obtained the citizenship of their country of settlement. If one restricts 
the count to permanent residents who retained an Iraqi passport, whether or not they 
returned regularly to Iraq, it is unlikely that their number exceeded a few thousands in 
each country. 
 
Finally, about 20,000 Iraqis had settled in Saudi Arabia or had dual citizenship: 
among them were traders and businessmen, often involved in cross-border economic 
activities, partly thanks to tribal social networks operating on both sides of the border 
and sometimes beyond. Among immigrants in the narrow definition of the word, one 
can include the exiled leadership of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood who benefited from 
the patronage of the Saudi authorities. In addition there were movements and 
exchanges between Shi’ite communities from Iraq and the east of the Arabian 
peninsula (Delouvain 2002; Luizard, 2002: 212; interviews, Jordan, 2003 and 
London, 2004). 
 
1.2 Intercontinental migration 
 
Some European capitals, particularly London and, to a lesser extent Paris, had 
received Iraqis who had left their country at different times, depending on 
developments in their country’s political history. Among those who left Iraq for strictly 
political reasons, very few launched asylum applications, preferring other venues to 
gain residence in Europe at a time when it was still relatively easy for upper-class 
and upper-middle class Iraqis to get student or employment visas. In London, capital 
of the former mandatory power in Iraq, were found the following groups who 
maintained limited, if any, interactions: Assyrian Christians who had arrived in the 
1940-1950s after serving in a special force created by the British in Iraq and their 
descendants who barely asserted their identity as Iraqis (Al-Rasheed, 1998); 
monarchists who had fled the 1958 revolution; opponents of all outlooks – 
Communists, Sunni Islamists, various Shi’ite political and religious movements etc. – 
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who had experienced repression in Iraq and continued to be politically active in exile 
(Rahe, 2002; interviews, London, 2004). There was also an emigration which can be 
best described as ideologically induced: exiled had not been directly repressed in 
Iraq but were members of the professions and intellectuals for whom the political 
context of Iraq under its successive regimes was uncongenial (interviews).  
 
Whether forced or induced, migrants retained links with Iraq through different types of 
movements, in particular those of relatives and friends who continued to live in Iraq 
and travelled to Europe on business, for visits or to further their studies. Amman and 
Damascus also were meeting points were those who had established themselves in 
Europe could meet those settled in countries neighbouring Iraq or, in the case of 
Amman, relatives and friends still living in Iraq and visiting for that purpose. 
Relationships were also mediated through the institutional structures of political 
parties and religious communities in Iraq which operated underground when these 
organisations were outlawed. This was the case, for example, of the Iraqi Communist 
Party (ICP) (Batatu, 1978). It was also the case of the religious, educational and 
charitable organisation established at the end of the 1980s around the Shi’ite spiritual 
leader Abulqasem al-Khoei, which will be discussed in further detail below.   
 
Descendants of the Assyrians who had left during the first decades of the 20
th
 
Century were also to be found further afield in North America and Australia. Since 
then, these communities had built upon a continuous yet relatively low number of 
new arrivals who were leaving Iraq through a dynamic of chain family migration. In 
some cases, they were supporters of an Assyrian national movement or members of 
the ICP, although most of them were not politically active. This outmigration was 
managed through mechanisms of family and communal solidarity and reproduced in 
the diaspora the socioeconomic, confessional and kinship patterns which had existed 
in Iraq within these Christian communities (Danis 2008; DIMIA, 2004; 
correspondences Australia 2001-2003; interviews Amman and Damascus 1998-
2001). 
 
Finally, a small group of migrants from the Muslim economic elite chose to settle in 
the USA as of the 1960s, in a country which was both more liberal and more stable 
than Iraq. By contrast with the migratory movements of Assyrians, this flow was 
neither communally-based nor were migrants identifying strongly with sectarian 
divisions (here Sunni and Shi’ite). The dynamics of this migration was primarily class- 
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and family-based (Grieco, 2003; internet correspondences USA 2001-2003; 
interviews Amman 1998-2001). 
 
1.3 Multipolarity, networks and circulations  
 
There existed different types of links between the intercontinental poles, between the 
regional and intercontinental levels of Iraqi outmigration, and between regional poles 
and with Iraq. 
 
At the intercontinental level, it was common for extended families to have members 
in Europe, North America and Australia, though one cannot systematically refer to a 
diasporic Iraqi order of migration, which would imply a certain level of organisation 
and a specific outlook shared by all members. It is more appropriate to talk of the 
multipolarity of Iraqi emigration made possible by the type of economic activities 
conducted by circulatory migrants: businessmen, investors, entrepreneurs and 
merchants whose families were settled in Europe or the USA (sometimes with 
members in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula and/or Jordan), while they themselves 
travelled between a number of economic locations within all these regions. 
Multipolarity was in part the outcome of the authoritarian character of the Ba'athist 
regime which controlled certain flows, particularly those of finance and information, 
but also the movement of Iraqi nationals across borders by making the granting of 
travel documents conditional on political allegiance. A third factor explained the 
functioning of the poles and networks: the closure of Iraq’s borders with some of its 
neighbours. These two types of constraints on movements forced Iraqis settled 
abroad to adopt various strategies to by-pass the obstacles set in their path by 
states, strategies which were facilitated by the fact that nearly all the political, 
religious, ethnic and socio-economic groups from which Iraqi migrant communities 
were composed had access to a European capital as a centre of gravity.  
 
London was the first location where members of most of the groups dispersed in the 
Middle East and in the west met. Financial and information flows converged to this 
city before being partially re-directed elsewhere. In the case of the exiled ICP, Paris 
played this central role, with Italian cities acting as secondary poles, a configuration 
which can be attributed to the historical development of national communist parties in 
France and Italy. Several urban centers in the European Communist block also 
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played an important part, having attracted members of the Iraqi Communist 
intelligentsia as students and residents.  
 
In addition to a European pole, the majority of groups had a Middle Eastern pole, 
usually one of the foci for regional outmigration. A main regional pole could also be 
the link for secondary regional poles. Thus, Amman was a centre for monarchists 
and businessmen. Some of the latter were also in connection with Saudi Arabia for 
activities involving the local Iraqi business sector. The city of Qom in Iran, central to 
several Iraqi Shi’ite schools of thought, was part of a network that included religious 
groups in Damascus and Lebanon. The significant Assyrian and Chaldean 
communities in Aleppo also had connections in Amman, Istanbul or Urmieh in 
northeastern Iran. There are no indications to suggest that the Iraqi Muslim Brothers 
who took refuge in Saudi Arabia lacked relations with the Jordanian members of the 
Brotherhood, making Amman their secondary regional pole. All these poles were 
likely to have separate links with Iraq through various types of movements. It is the 
density and type of these flows, as well as the means used for communications, 
which helped define a hierarchy in the importance of the poles, as well as the fact 
that some poles played the role of staging posts between Iraqis settled out of the 
region and Iraq. This is particularly the case with respect to those who had been 
compelled to leave Iraq under repression and were unable to communicate directly 
with people who remained in Iraq without endangering them. While information was 
most likely to travel by telephone or post between the intercontinental and regional 
levels, oral transmission through a human intermediary was the means by which it 
was most likely to continue its route to reach its recipients in Iraq. 
Organisations which were illegal in Iraq could not manage without a regional link and 
human intermediaries either for transfers of funds or for the transmission of 
information
5
.  
 
Consider the example of the Imam Al-Khoei Foundation. In the 1980s the Imam, a 
major spiritual authority (marja') among Shi’ites worldwide, was living in the Iraqi holy 
city of Najaf. Although he refrained from expressing political views, his and his 
followers’ involvement in religious, educational or charitable activities were monitored 
and hampered by agents of the Iraqi regime. On the other hand, as Abulqasem al-
Khoei did not support the Islamic revolution in Iran, it was also impossible for his 
                                                   
5
  This section in based on interviews conducted in Amman, Teheran, Damascus, Aleppo, London, Rome 
and Paris between 2001 and 2008. 
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followers in that country to establish an institution which would assist them in carrying 
out their activities. At the end of the 1980s, the Imam established a foundation with 
its head office in London. He continued to reside in Najaf and appointed one of his 
sons as head of the foundation. As was the case with certain exiled political parties 
which had no legal existence in Iraq, London became the administrative and financial 
centre for the foundation’s activities in Iraq. Thus donations collected throughout the 
Shi’ite communities in the world (Iran, Lebanon, Gulf states, Pakistan, India, diaspora 
communities in West Africa, in North America etc.) converged towards London. Such 
collections were made possible through a semi-informal network based on the 
spiritual link between the marja’ and his disciples, who were religious men (mujtahid) 
themselves surrounded by religious and lay supporters, and on the ritual obligation of 
the khoms, a religious tax specific to the Shi’ites. Amounts which the Imam wanted to 
use for his activities in Iraq were transferred from the London banking system, where 
funds were concentrated, to an account in Kuwait. There a mujtahid withdrew them 
from the banking system so that they could be carried into Iraq by followers who 
travelled between the two countries. This was a way to by-pass the controls of the 
Iraqi authorities and the border between Iran and Iraq which was a fighting zone 
during the Iran-Iraq war and later remained closed to travellers. The liberal banking 
system of Kuwait played the role of a financial conduit because of its proximity to the 
Shi’ite regions of southern Iraq but also to the Shi’ite centres in the Persian Gulf. The 
latter, which were secondary poles of Iraqi Shi’ite outmigration, were also staging 
posts for a considerable share of donations collected in Iran which could not be taken 
out of the country through the banking system as the Islamic Republic’s authorities 
controlled international financial transfers (interviews, Al Khoei Foundation, London, 
June 2004). 
 
The groups of Iraqi emigrants who were compelled to use avoidance strategies were 
those who opposed the Iraqi regime, in particular members of outlawed political 
parties. Without achieving the transnational dimensions of the Al Khoei foundation, 
an institutionalised religious movement structured at the global level, all the exiled 
opposition groups that maintained links with supporters in Iraq (regardless of their 
level of activity) were compelled to set up more or less complex set-ups. Regional 
links were essential for these structures to repackage funds and information in a way 
that made them transferable to or from Iraq.  
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Migration from Iraq before the Gulf war can be qualified as being dominated by flows 
of people who left Iraq under political duress within a continuum of forced-migration, 
from compelled to induced. The majority of migrants had been expelled or forced to 
flee repression. Part of the socio-professional and intellectual elite and holders of 
financial capital chose expatriation or exile under no direct physical constraint. 
However, this latter trend did not develop in response to the needs of economies 
more dynamic than that of Iraq but because individuals were not satisfied with the 
limited opportunities the Iraqi political system imposed upon their activities or their 
free expression. Regardless of the causes of their emigration, Iraqi exiles and 
expatriates were living in countries of immigration under a variety of legal statuses 
(as citizens, refugees, asylum seekers, long-term residents, on student visas, etc). 
Members of the same social groups (students, businesspeople, professionals, 
political activists, religious communities) and of the same family were likely to have 
left Iraq under different types of pressures. Some were still able to travel back to Iraq 
while others were not. The characteristics of Iraqi migration reflected the political and 
economic circumstances of the country that was producing it: its economic prosperity 
based on oil-extraction and trade; the developmental choices made by the regime 
that had allowed the emergence of a class of cadres and professionals who were 
granted employment; an unstable and contested state challenged by a variety of 
political movements; a problematic national construction in which some ethnic and 
confessional groups were targeted collectively by the regime; and a territorial 
sovereignty which was disputed internally and externally. 
 
To assess, however roughly, the number of Iraqis living abroad on the eve of the 
1990-1991 Gulf war, it is necessary to first exclude people who circulated regularly 
across the border from Iraq rather than being involved in longer-term migration, 
members of the Assyrian community who did not, or no longer, defined themselves 
as Iraqis, and those who were expelled and had obtained Iranian nationality. Making 
use of the different sources used in this first part, it might be reasonable to estimate 
that somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000 Iraqis lived out of their country before 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. If the more recent waves of Assyrian outmigration 
and people who had been “re-integrated” as Iranian nationals were to be included, 
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this figure would increase by 200,000. Altogether, the figure of 1 million people of 
Iraqi origin living out of Iraq before 1990 appears to be a generous estimate
6
. 
 
2. Between the Gulf War and the fall of the Ba'athist regime 
 
Out of a total population which increased from 18 to 24 millions, maybe up to one 
and a half million Iraqis left their country permanently between 1990 and end 2002
7
. 
The most important initial migratory movements took place between August 1990 - 
on the eve of the Gulf War and the regime’s order prohibiting its nationals from 
leaving the country - and mid 1991 when a wave of migrants followed the lifting of the 
prohibition to exit, whereas refugees were prompted to exit by the repression of the 
Shi’ite and Kurdish uprisings in February and March. During these few months, 
national and international organisations involved in refugee management estimated 
that a total of nearly 3 million Iraqis and other nationals took refuge temporarily or 
permanently in neighbouring countries. Once the number of Iraqi refugees who 
returned in the months following the conflict (in particular the Kurds who had fled 
temporarily to Iran) has been deducted, there remained between 450,000 and 
500,000 more Iraqis outside their country than there were before the Gulf War. Some 
200,000 Shi’ite Arabs had gone to swell the ranks of refuges in Iran and were duly 
                                                   
6
  This figure does not include those Iraqis Jews who still maintained a feeling of national belonging to Iraq 
and who are difficult to quantify. Almost all Iraqi Jews lost their nationality during the mass emigration of the period 
1950s-1970s, most of them going to Israel, the USA and the UK. 
7
  Figures for refugees and migrants publicized by specialised organizations and host governments are 
always debatable and cannot be taken at face-values since the interests and capacities of the various actors play a 
major role in the methods of data collecting and dissemination (see Bakewell 1999 and Crisp 1999b). Hence we 
cautiously reproduce figures for Iraqi refugees and migrants used by institutions: in 2002, according to the UNHCR, 
there were three to four million Iraqis “dispersed in the world” (UNHCR, 2003a:1 and 2003b: 5). It is within this 
bracket that various estimates were made during 2003 at a time when the number of Iraqis abroad became a matter 
of concern for international organisations as well as a political and financial issue for the new Iraqi government. 
Provided one does not claim to carry out a precise demographic evaluate and that one uses the available data 
critically, it is possible to make reasonable estimates of the size of Iraqi outmigration since the Gulf war. On the one 
hand, a number of publicly released figures can be viewed as relatively reliable: UNHCR's figures concerning its own 
operations (ie Iraqis registered with the organisation, but not its estimates of non-registered Iraqis), those produced 
by national organisations responsible for managing asylum applications in western countries and in Iran (available in 
the statistical section of the website of the UNHCR), those coming from western state agencies responsible for 
immigration and concerning movements and presence of “people born in Iraq” or “Iraqi nationals” 
(www.migrationinformation.org). On the other hand, it is more difficult to assess flows and stocks of Iraqi migrants in 
countries neighbouring Iraq where systems of data collection on entry and exit are not always reliable, which did not 
account for irregular entries, and which claim on numbers of Iraqis were compounded by political considerations with 
the possibility that numbers were either overstated or played down. It is a best possible to suggest estimates based 
on the existing public data (eg entries and exits at borders for Jordan). 
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registered as such (some also evaded registration); 35,000 others remained in Saudi 
Arabia in camps where they were registered; Syria retained on its territory about 
40,000 Iraqis more than were there prior to the war; an estimated 200,000 Iraqis took 
refuge in Jordan, un addition to a at least three times as many foreign workers who 
were fleeing Iraq, many only transiting Jordan (LHCR, 1992; USCR, 1991; Jordanian 
statistical abstracts). 
Until 2003, there was no more sudden outflow, instead there were four steady 
currents of emigration: two of them continued throughout the period involving maybe 
500,000 Iraqis who left their country through Turkey from the Kurdish de facto 
autonomous area (see Sirkeci 2005) and a similar number through Jordan; the third 
concerned the 50,000 or so Iraqis who took refuge in Iran between the end of 1991 
and 1995; the last current was composed of ten to twenty thousand people who 
benefited from the partial reopening of the border with Syria in 1997. Except in Iran, 
stocks were not stable, as a large number of migrants used the countries 
neighbouring Iraq as transit stages either towards other regional countries, such as 
Libya or Yemen, or towards western countries. There were also movements back to 
Iraq and circulatory migrants, especially between Iraq and Jordan.   
 
In 2002, 550,000 Iraqis throughout the world benefited from refugee status: 350,000 
of these registered refugees were in Iran (combining 100,000 refugees from before 
the Gulf war and 250,000 who had arrived in later years), 20,000 were awaiting 
resettlement
8
 mostly in Arab countries near Iraq and in Turkey. In these countries, 
particularly in Jordan and Turkey, at least 600,000 other Iraqis were living in irregular 
situations, either because they had entered irregularly, or because they had 
overstayed their visit or residence permits. The UNHCR estimated that 450,000 of 
those were in a “refugee-like situation”, ie unprotected and unassisted by their hosts 
states or international organisations. Finally, as will be detailed below, one third of 
the migrants who left Iraq between 1990 and 2002 had settled in a western country 
mainly under an asylum regime.  
   
How patterns and trends articulated, and how they were in rupture or in continuity 
with patterns pre-dating the Gulf war will be the object of the following section. 
                                                   
8
  Those awaiting resettlement were in countries which did not grant them asylum but had an agreement with 
the UNHCR whereby the organisations received and processed asylum claims, accepting or rejecting them, and 
acted as intermediary with countries – in their majority western ones but also Iran– that took quotas for refugee 
resettlement.  
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Variables for an analysis are situated at several levels: at the political, policy, 
economic and legal levels in the countries affected by this migration, starting in Iraq; 
at the level of the social organisation of Iraqi migration, looking particularly at group 
solidarities; at the level of organisations and social dynamics that operate beyond the 
level of states, such as the UNHCR but also social networks which allow 
communications and movement of people between different countries. These 
different aspects will be addressed by following the regional and global trajectories of 
Iraqi migrants before looking at a number of relevant social variables. 
 
2.1 Leaving Iraq 
 
2.1.1 Communication and exchange 
 
The state of the networks and other means of communication and exchange between 
Iraq and the rest of the world was a prime determinant of the directions taken by Iraqi 
migrants. These networks and means did not undergo significant changes between 
1990 and the fall of the regime in early 2003 as they were directly constrained by the 
international sanction regime imposed upon Iraq by the UN Security Council in 
response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
 
Starting August 1990 it was impossible to leave Iraq by sea or air because of the 
embargo. From Baghdad, it was also impossible to get visas for western countries as 
they had closed their embassies or downgraded their consular operations. However 
the international isolation of Iraq was not only the result of the embargo but also of 
the regime’s determination to control entry and exit flows to and from the country. 
Policies of control over the mouvements of nationals already existed before the Gulf 
war. However they were strengthened after 1991 reflecting the hardening of the 
attitude of the security services towards groups suspected of subversive activities, on 
the one hand, and attempts at containing inside Iraq the middle-class and holders of 
capital tempted to flee increasingly deteriorating economic conditions, on the other 
hand. Thus, not only was the telephone network in poor conditions following the war, 
but calls were also monitored. Iraqis therefore refrained from discussing over the 
phone their migration projects with those who had already left the country. Similarly, 
international mail, routed via Jordan overland, was liable to be opened by the 
regime’s agents. As for internet and satellite access, whereas they became 
commonplace in the second half of the 1990s in some of Iraq’s neighbours - 
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particularly Turkey and Jordan –, in Iraq they remained a privilege reserved to a few 
high-level officials and some state institutions. It was therefore difficult for the 
average Iraqi to obtain precise information on any aspect of the procedures 
necessary for migrating out of the Middle East, and even on the situation of Iraqi 
migrants based in countries as close as Jordan or Iran. Actual departure was 
therefore constrained by the difficulties involved in taking an informed decision. In 
fact, different factors combined to make communication between Iraq and the rest of 
the world difficult, reducing exchange flows to narrow social circles within which 
different members were confident that mutual trust was ensured. These modes of 
communication, which did not rely upon technology or institutional networks, moved 
informally from one person to another either orally or through written messages.  
 
On the other hand, while international bank transfers remained as controlled as they 
had been in the earlier period, it also became extremely difficult to find ways of by-
passing these controls as the borders with most of the neighbouring countries were 
closed. At the same time, as will be developed below, the cost of emigration 
continually increased and required means which many would-be migrants could only 
find outside Iraq itself. The marginalisation of the country with respect to international 
communications and transport networks, and, more generally, its isolation resulted in 
the reorganisation of intercontinental migration from neighbouring countries. 
 
2.1.2 Control over population mouvements 
 
The regime deeply influenced mobility across borders by preventing certain 
categories of people from leaving the country or, conversely, by violently forcing 
others across the borders. This was primarily done through a series of political 
decisions which were manifested in administrative procedures and legal 
requirements, but also through a process of arbitrariness, coercition and various 
levels of physical pressure. 
 
At a time when the states of the former Soviet bloc had just lifted restrictions on the 
travel of their citizens, Saddam Hussein’s regime started to exercise an increasingly 
tight control over the movements of Iraqis willing to head for other countries. 
Restrictive measures were introduced to halt the departure of the middle class and 
the intelligentsia towards Jordan – the only country whose border with Iraq remained 
open – and beyond. Starting in 1993, an exit tax was imposed, and its amount 
19 
 
increased systematically thereafter. In 1994, the regime added a new requirement for 
holders of university degrees: a bank deposit or a mortgage on properties to the 
value of 1 million Iraqi dinars (ID) – or US$ 665 – was requested as a guarantee of 
return. Would-be migrant needed an exit permit delivered by the security services as 
well as, for adult men, a certificate from the Ministry of Defence stating that they had 
completed their military service. It was particularly problematic for civil servants to 
obtain the necessary permits and extremely difficult for them to leave the country with 
their spouses and/or children, except if they could justify of specific reasons (for 
example medical treatment) and provide a higher level of financial guarantees for 
their return. Adult women, for their part, remained also submitted to previous 
legislation whereby they could not travel without a male relative or a written 
permission from their husbands or fathers, considered their legal tutors under Iraq 
law.   
 
The regime also decreed that those of its nationals who sought asylum abroad, 
including with the UNHCR, were liable to be sentenced to death if they returned, a 
sentence sometimes commuted to amputation of part of the ear. These measures 
were primarily aimed at preventing the return of those who had taken refuge in Iran in 
1991 when escaping the repression of the Shi’ite uprising and whom the regime 
suspected of collusion with the Islamic Republic. The series of amnesties announced 
all through the 1990s and early 2000s were aimed at attracting back those with 
professional qualifications as well as capital holders who had left for other Arab 
countries or the west. The regime applied seemingly arbitrary practices: those 
refugees who took the risk of returning were sometimes pardoned, but also 
sometimes imprisoned or assassinated, particularly in 1999-2000 (AIJ/FIDH, 2003: 
36). 
By contrast with earlier decades, the regime did not use mass expulsions towards 
Iran as it did not want to strengthen the Shi’ite exiled political-religious opposition and 
armed resistance. Instead, it adopted a policy of imprisonment or physical elimination 
of Shi’ite opponents, or forced displacement of populations within Iraq. However, 
despite the regime’s efforts to prevent it, the migratory flow towards Iran continued as 
a reaction to state coercition. The case of the Ma’dan, the social group living in the 
Marshes in the south of the country, is typical of this process. Between 1991 and 
1995 the regime systematically drained the Marshes. Drainage was accompanied 
with the destruction of villages and group assassinations. At the same time, the Iraqi 
Special Forces intensified the mining of the border area with Iran. This campaign had 
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a number of objectives, overtly economic and developmental, but also political. By 
sealing the border, the Iraqi regimes attempted to prevent the infiltration of guerrillas 
supported by Iran in one direction and the departure of opponents who used the 
Marshes as a refuge in the other. A large proportion of the Ma’dan people were 
forcibly displaced and spontaneously resettled in the urban centres of southern Iraq 
and Baghdad, but about 40,000 of them managed to flee to Iran (Clark and Magee 
2001; Fawcett and Tanner 2002; Tripp 2002: 256). 
 
2.1.3 Border controls and their restructuring effects 
 
The state of Iraq’s borders with its neighbours remained a crucial issue of concern for 
the movement of people. Arguably, borders are never, or extremely rarely, 
completely sealed. States can close border posts and try to make the borderline 
unbreachable at all points by installing practical obstacles such as walls, trenches, 
barbed wire, minefields etc… This was done, to varying degrees by Syria, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait before or after the Gulf war and by Iraq on its southern border with 
Iran. But some individuals were sufficiently determined to attempt crossing by finding 
weak points in these obstacles. Generally the pressing need to cross gives rise to a 
body of specialists –human smugglers – in most cases inhabitants of the border zone 
who are used to circulating, regularly or not, across the border, and are familiar both 
with the physical and social conditions on both sides. In the present case, the border 
peoples were members of some of the Ma’dan tribal groups, with members on both 
sides of the Iraq-Iran border, or bedouin tribes in the Badiat esh-Sham - the desert 
steppe that spans the borders between Iraq, Syria and Jordan- and also, in the 
North, Kurds whose kin groups straddled the borders with Turkey (Içduygu and 
Toktas, 2002: 25-54), Iran or Syria
9
. However, the flow of migrants is likely to be 
reduced to a drip when borders are both officially closed and highly militarised. 
 
Whereas, after 1995, it became extremely perilous to cross the southern border with 
Iran, the Iraqi regime continued to target specific people or groups who tried to 
escape coercion. That was the case, between 1996 and 2000, of members of Shi’ite 
political groups, in particular the Da'wa partly, who were victims of assassination 
                                                   
9
  Some bedouin tribes have members who live on both sides of the borders between Iraq and Kuwait or 
Saudi Arabia. It can be hypothesized that the reason why these countries did not receive significant numbers of Iraqi 
fugitives was not so much the high level of militarization of their borders, but rather their systematic policy of 
expulsion of illegal migrants, documented by a number of international human rights organisations, and, more 
importantly, well known to Iraqis interviewed in Amman. 
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attempts or faced the threat of imprisonment. Had they had the possibility of 
choosing a destination, many would have taken refuge in the Islamic Republic
10
. 
However, it was Jordan that gave refuge to several dozen thousands of them, as 
UNHCR statistics for that period and interviews show
11
. Until then the two larger 
migratory “systems” (the term being used here to imply a large degree of stability)  
between Iraq and its neighbours had been independent of one another: on the one 
hand, the ancient Iraqi-Iranian system was linked to the Iraqi-Syrian system through 
the religious and commercial circulations of Shi'ites; on the other hand, the Iraqi-
Jordanian system (in both its pre- and post-Gulf war configurations) did not articulate 
with the movements of the members of Iraqi Shi’ite community to either Iran or Syria. 
The Iraqi-initiated sealing of the Iranian border disturbed the modus operandi of 
these two systems and created a link between them. 
 
This linkage had two major outcomes. First, the financial and administrative 
obstacles set in place by the regime made travel to Jordan more expensive than it 
had been to Iran while access to the latter had been possible through clandestine 
routes. Shi’ite religious groups had connections within the Marsh populations which 
facilitated their passage. Such connections were inexistant with the Sunni bedouin 
smugglers/guides who offered their services across the desert and the Jordanian 
border. Connections and trust were difficult to create anew for lack of common tribal 
or sectarian ties to call upon. Only one of the several dozens Iraqis close to the 
Da'wa party interviewed in Jordan between 1998 and 2001 had opted for clandestine 
crossing to Jordan. All the others had bribed Iraqi civil servants to obtain documents 
allowing their departure. Bribes were paid in addition to the compulsory exit tax at the 
border. It meant that departure had to be prepared in advance and entailed high 
financial costs. The first impact of the closure of the border with Iran was therefore to 
reduce the number of people from the concerned group who had the means to leave, 
which was indeed the regime’s aim. Secondly, once in Jordan, members of this 
group attempted to establish contact with relatives or religious leaders in Iran thus 
                                                   
10
  Iranian statistics bear witness to a very significant decline in the number of Iraqi refugees arriving in 
Iranian border camps after 1996 (Amar, 2001: 13). 
11
  The economic interdependence of the two countries was the main reason why it was impossible for both 
Jordan and Iraq to close their border. In one direction, Iraq supplied Jordan with oil at a very low cost. From 1996 
onwards, goods traded within the UN-sponsored “oil-for-food” programme transited through the Jordanian seaport of 
Aqaba. During that period the only way Iraqis could access a number of services and activities was through Amman 
which had good international communications (western embassies, airport etc.). There were no restrictions on the 
entry of Iraqis into Jordanian territory. The issue of their residence will be discussed below. 
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creating a connection between the two migratory systems through human, financial 
and information movements that transited through Syria or the UK, the process of 
which I have described in a previous articles (Chatelard 2004). 
 
To conclude discussion of the border issue it is worth noting that a clear distinction 
must be made between the different types of obstacles faced by those who want to 
cross borders. A border being an interface, there can be constraints on both sides or 
only on one side, just as there can be none. This latter condition was never realised 
for Iraqis who wanted to leave their country.  
 
2.1.4 Cumulative constraints and socioeconomic assets  
 
The various constraints which restricted departure from Iraq had a cumulative effect. 
With the drastic collapse in the value of the dinar, very few Iraqis had access to the 
amounts of money necessary to leave Iraq, let alone to travel beyond the Middle 
East. In 1996 the monthly salary of a middle level cadre in the public sector was 
equivalent to US$ 3 to 5 whereas the exit tax amounted to US$ 300 and an airline 
ticket between Amman and London cost another US$ 300. For many, these sums 
had to be added up to the compulsory bank deposit or mortgage. Releasing the 
necessary funds entailed access to savings, real estate or other marketable assets, 
or reliance on financial support from people inside Iraq with a high level of trust for 
both parties, ie within the family, close friends or religious associates. For many 
would-be migrants who had no intention of returning or who needed to bribe their 
way out, trust was the only assurance that secrecy would be kept on the use they 
intended to make of the funds. Failing access to funds within Iraq, it was essential not 
only to be able to obtain them through a network of acquaintances (relatives or 
members of the religious community) abroad, but also to transfer them via informal 
networks from Jordan. Here again, trust was a rare commodity.  
 
Economic cost and the difficulties to transfer funds were not the only constraints on 
migration projets. Social costs were extremely high too due to the measures taken by 
the regime that compelled most migrants to travel without family members and that 
impeded free communication between those remaining in Iraq and those having left. 
Additional costs were the always possible collective punishment exerted by the 
repressive organs of the regime on members of a family group for a son, a brother, a 
husband or even a cousin who was known to have exited Iraq without the requested 
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permissions. De facto, the regime had created the category of “illegal emigrant”, a 
crime for which kin of the perpetrator were punishable in his/her absentia. For many, 
leaving meant breaking away from one’s family and kin group for a long time and 
exposing them to danger, even to the risk of death. 
 
As interviews conducted with Iraqis who left post April 2003 show, disincentives were 
particularly effective in the case of two partially overlapping categories of would-be 
migrants from the urban educated middle-class who were immobilised. First those 
who were under no direct physical threat but were affected by the deterioration in 
living standards resulting from the economic blockade. Second those whose access 
to financial means was limited or who, having insufficient capital, were unable to 
mobilise such capital within their own social groups.  From 1991 to early 2003, there 
were of course cases of re-active migration when people who were under direct 
physical threat had to flee as a matter of urgency. But those were more likely to look 
for safer places inside Iraq, and sometimes undertake out-migration at a later stage. 
In practice, it was nearly impossible to cross the border without a minimum of capital 
or contacts among the smugglers or, in any case, without planning. 
Thus the people who left Iraq permanently were, in their majority, neither reactive 
fugitives who fled immediate instances of violence, nor those most affected by the 
deterioration of the social and economic conditions prevailing in the country. 
International migrants belonged to an intermediate category whose economic 
aspirations were often impossible to distinguish from their political motivations. This 
double characteristic merely reflected the very nature of the processes which were 
the most direct causes of emigration: on the one hand, the blockade was the 
economic tool of an international policy whose ultimate objective was to change the 
internal political order in Iraq (Graham-Brown, 1999); on the other, the Iraqi regime 
used scarce economic and social resources to achieve internal political objectives: it 
rationed these resources to its population, for example through the food-distribution 
system put in place under the oil-for-foor deal, but also through access to 
employment in the public sector, to basic necessities, to land and water (Fawcett and 
Tanner, 2002; HRW, 2003; Shehabaldin, 1999: 1-18). Some categories of the population 
were completely deprived while others were favoured. In both cases the economy 
was used to achieve political ends. This is clearly illustrated in the sociological 
profiles and motivations of Iraqis who left the country, regardless of the legal status 
which they obtained in countries of emigration. Another determining factor arose from 
the principle of collective responsibility which the regime used most frequently to 
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threaten family and wider social groups with physical or economic insecurity. Thus it 
maintained certain groups in a state of structural insecurity by collectively excluding 
them from access to economic resources or coercing them physically though house 
arrest, police interrogation, emprisonnement, torture and assassination.  
 
Within such a context, individual migratory decisions and trajectories can only be 
understood as collective processes, including the timing of migration. A social group 
which is threatened by the regime or other external forces is also one within which 
trust and solidarity are strongest to achieve migration objectives. Individual migration 
strategies were therefore based first and foremost on family links, and also possibly 
(by not systematically) on class, professional, religious, ethnic or tribal solidarities; in 
most cases they were family-driven and family-based, ie they aimed at removing a 
complete family unit from the situation of insecurity which prevailed in Iraq even 
though it was usually impossible for this migration to be achieved in a single journey. 
It is therefore unsurprising that Iraqi migration displayed features of labour migration 
due to the profile of the initial migrants – adult males with high professional 
qualifications – but that the process of family reunion happened far quicker than is 
the case in classical cases of labour migration
12
. 
 
A final consideration helps to understand the motivation which prompted a number of 
Iraqis to leave their country and also the destinations of some of these migrants. 
Regardless of the issue of state coercition, the degradation of the socio-economic 
conditions that had started with the Iran-Iraq war created a perception of insecurity by 
comparaison with the period of prosperity and welfare that had predated the 1980s. 
The closure of Iraq to exchanges with the rest of the world caused considerable 
frustration for the educated and intellectual classes. Indeed, since the 1970s, and by 
comparison with other nations in the Middle East, Iraqis, and in particular the vast 
middle class, had developed a high level of expectations with respect to working 
conditions, social and economic welfare, and access to consumer goods. The result 
is that the conditions that were likely to satisfy an Egyptian labour migrant in Jordan 
were not likely to satisfy an Iraqi exile.  
 
2. Emigration to Iraq’s neighbours 
                                                   
12
  Even when the principle of collective responsibility was not upheld, the benefits of a purely economic 
migration on the family which remained behind in Iraq were limited by impediments on communications and transfers 
of funds, hence the tendency towards rapid family reunion. 
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During the period under consideration, two thirds of Iraqi migrants remained in the 
countries of first migration neighbouring Iraq or in more distant Arab countries, 
whereas one third continued towards a country of asylum or emigration in the west. 
The following section will therefore address the following questions: who stayed 
permanently in the country of first arrival? Who only transited and how long did this 
transit last? What were the structural contexts in which migrants decided to stay or 
continue their journeys? Was a choice between these two options possible in all 
contexts? What were the factors that influenced the direction of those who migrated 
further afield? Is it possible to identify factors common to the four countries of first 
destination: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and Jordan? 
  
2.2.1 Saudi Arabia 
 
Saudi Arabia, which had taken no measures to regroup Iraqis or systematically 
control the movements and activities of Iraqis residing on its territory prior to 1991, 
continued to allow the activities of exiled Iraqi officers in coordination with the USA 
(Luizard, 2002: 209). By contrast, the monarchy established an extremely rigid 
framework for Shi’te refugees from the Gulf war, who were mostly army deserters 
and therefore single men who had left their families behind. Controlled by the police, 
these “guests of the King” were compelled to reside in the Rafha camp, located near 
the Iraqi border and far removed from Saudi urban centres. Refugees were not 
allowed to engage in political activities or to have any relations with the Saudi Shi’ite 
community, including relatives. During the Gulf war, the Saudi authorities had 
negotiated with US civil and military authorities an arrangement with the UNHCR 
which some other countries later supported. The UNHCR exerted a mandate of 
temporary protection over the refugees. The Saudis took responsibility for the 
financial costs: housing, education, health, a monthly stipend or supervised 
employment in the town neighbouring Rafha camp. As a counterpart, a number of 
western countries and Iran agreed to permanently resettle these refugees in their 
own countries and did so in batches throughout the 1990s (Shoeb et ali 2007; 
correspondance Saudi Arabia 2001). 
 
Their status and the surveillance exerted by the Saudis over movements outside of 
the camp did not give the Iraqis room for the slightest choice. They had to prepare 
themselves for a new migration which they hoped for as confinement in Rafha was 
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psychologically stressful. Their migratory dynamics in the following phase were not 
determined by factors of attraction specific to the countries of final destination but by 
the policies of the host countries with respect to quotas and selection criteria for the 
refugees they had agreed to accept
13
. At best, refugees were allowed to express 
preferences, but states were sovereign. Over about 10 years, the selection process 
implemented by the relevant authorities of a handful of countries redistributed 30 000 
Iraqi refugees from Rafha mostly to the USA, but also to Canada, Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Australia and Iran. By April 2003, there were effectively no 
resettlement possibilities for the 5 200 people remaining in the camp as they did not 
fit into the selection criteria of the resettlement countries. After the American invasion 
of Iraq, they returned to Iraq. 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2. Syria 
 
Ba'athist Syria, alongside other states in the region (in particular Iraq and Yemen) 
subscribes in principle to a pan-Arab ideology: in the 1990s, it still accepted on its 
territory nationals of other Arab states as non-Syrian Arabs rather than as foreigners 
whose stay was subject to restrictions. In theory, members of this category had the 
right to entry and unlimited residence and benefited from the same social and 
economic advantages as Syrians: access to the labour market, property, social 
services, health, education etc. Although the border with Iraq was officially closed 
since 1982, refugees, mainly Assyrians, crossed into Syrian territory at the time of 
the Gulf war. They were initially compelled to remain in camps (in particular al-Hol) in 
the north-eastern province of the Jazira until regulations on movements were eased 
for those whom the Syrian authorities considered to present no security threat. In the 
cities – Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzor or Hasakeh – community networks and 
institutions then played a major role in ensuring their access to housing, social and 
financial assistance and employment (interviews Syria 2001 and 2007). Moreover, 
Syria has granted a form of discretionary asylum to certain Iraqi opposition groups, in 
particular welcoming defecting officers (Luizard, 2002: 210). Overall, it can be said 
that the flexibility of the legal framework and of the social and economic opportunities 
                                                   
13
  Some countries only accepted entire nuclear families. Others made a selection on the basis of 
qualifications. Rare were those who received refugees suffering from serious health problems, physical handicap, 
psychological trauma or elderly people. The basic humanitarian principle which all respected was not to separate 
nuclear families (interviews with the UNHCR and specialised staff in several western embassies, Amman 2001). 
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provided by Syria to those Iraqis whom it allowed to settle gave them the possibility 
to re-establish social relations and economic livelihoods. Moreover, Syria allowed the 
UNHCR to receive asylum requests, to grant refugee status and to seek resettlement 
for refugees in third countries.  
 
If this policy is in stark contrast with the one adopted by Saudi Arabia, there is a 
common point between the two countries: neither provided asylum on the basis of 
international refugee standards, ie neither was bound by international commitments 
concerning the non-refoulement or deportation of people at risk of persecution in their 
country of origin
14
. However, during the war and in the following years, Assyrians 
were not the only ones to enter Syria illegally, crossing a border which was not 
heavily militarised, and using the services of smugglers when necessary; members of 
the Shi’ite opposition and Kurds also entered Syria. According to international 
organisations (interviews with the UNHCR and Amnesty International) the Syrian 
security services intercepted most of these refugees after they had entered the 
country. The majority, who were considered undesirable, were imprisoned or sent 
back to Iraq where they were in danger by the mere fact of their entry into Syria. This 
might have acted as a disincentive for other would-be migrants.  
 
As for those Iraqis allowed to remain in Syria, their legal status and the administrative 
conditions of their residence remained stable and rather satisfactory; they were not in 
themselves conducive to further migration. Other elements then came into play in the 
choice that some people made to move on, the destination they chose and also their 
ability to implement these projects. For some, professional frustration was a reason 
to move on, either because they did not find work, or because the jobs available were 
not up to their hopes and/or their qualifications. For others, it was rather a wish to 
become involved in opposition to the Iraqi regime by joining the Shi’ite resistance 
movement in Iran. Others joined Hezbollah in Lebanon. Finally, with respect to 
members of the two groups mentioned above as well as those who might have been 
satisfied with their situation in Syria, family members settled in Iran or in the west 
acted as pull factors. 
 
There were two periods of intercontinental migration from Syria based on communal 
connections. Assyrians left from 1991 onwards to rejoin family members in America, 
                                                   
14
  International norms with respect to definition and protection of refugees are stated in the 1951 Geneva 
Conventions and the 1967 Protocol. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and most other Arab countries (with the exception of 
Yemen and Egypt) are not signatories to this texts (see Zaiotti, 2006). 
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Australia or the UK through legal means by requesting emigration or family reunion 
visas
15
 from the embassies of these countries as their co-religionists had been doing 
for a long time from Iraq. This trend ended towards 1994, when those who were still 
in Syria had no family links close enough with those in the west to claim family 
reunion. In addition, western embassies started being more restrictive with respect to 
granting visas to Iraqis as appears from interviews conducted in 2001 with consular 
officials in several of these embassies. Asylum requests made to the UNHCR or to 
the embassies of states which operated such schemes (eg Canada) then became an 
alternative mechanism to attempt to by-pass restrictions on emigration through the 
previous channel. The secondary migration of Shi’ite, which had previously been 
directed towards Iran or Lebanon, then began to take over from that of the Assyrians 
as they aimed at the same destinations. People who had been through the Rafha 
camp in Saudi Arabia and had been resettled in North America, Europe or Australia 
from 1992 onwards became the initial migrants for a Shi’a community-based 
migration whose chain dynamic relied on kinship as did that of the Assyrians. Yet, 
again for the same reasons, the movement slowed down two or three years later. In 
the case of both the Assyrians and the Shi’ites, this period of legal migration was 
followed by a period when migration was mainly clandestine, with a new thrust 
brought about by the very controlled reopening of the Syrian-Iraqi border in 1997 (El 
Yazami, 2002 ; Interviews, Syria, 2001, 2003, 2007). 
 
2.2.3 Jordan 
 
The very significant regular inflow of Iraqis over twelve years (maybe up to one 
million with the majority transiting and a large number of circulatory migrants) and the 
permanent stock of maybe between 200 000 and 300 000 caused embarrassment to 
the Jordanian authorities, whose population was only five million in 2000. A policy of 
mass expulsion of undesirables was not on the agenda however, nor was a closure 
of the border. The political economy of Jordan's relations with Iraq and with 
international funders prevented both. Being unable to contain the inflow, Jordan 
made it difficult for Iraqis to stay; the consequence being that a large proportion of 
them were persuaded to seek means of leaving the country. In Jordan there was only 
                                                   
15
  Family reunion can be achieved through an immigration or an asylum regime. These requests are usually 
dealt with by different administrative units and the level of relationship requested between family members can vary 
according to country and regime. In Denmark, for example, the father and mother of an adult refugee could benefit 
from reunion in the late 1990s, whereas a non refugee resident was only be allowed to bring in his/her spouse and 
children (interview, Danish embassy, Amman, 2001). 
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one possible legal status for Iraqis, that of foreigners subject to restrictions on the 
conditions and length of their stay. Throughout the period under consideration, the 
vast majority of Iraqis in Jordan were either visitors on a temporary residency, or 
irregular aliens who had overstayed their six-month residency. The latter were liable 
to expulsion to Iraq, a threat which was sometimes implemented but was spared to 
women, children or the elderly. Before the Gulf war and in the early 1990s 
approximately  
30 000 Iraqis obtained a longer-term residency and work permit, filling qualified 
employment niches. Jordan did not provide asylum based on the Geneva Convention 
or a domestic legislation
16
. 
 
These factors, in association with the permanent opening of the border with Iraq, 
meant that Jordan was more a transit zone that a place where Iraqis settled. As the 
country played the role of a sieve and filter, or Frontier zone, between Iraq and the 
rest of the world, it is arguably from its territory that the main flows of Iraqi 
outmigration developed their intercontinental scope
17
. Between 1990 and 2002 
several migration currents from Iraq to Jordan can be identified, each with specific 
social characteristics, though there is no absolute temporal break between them. 
 
The first current involved refugees seeking safety in anticipation or as a result of the 
1990-1991 international armed conflict. International organisations put numbers of 
Iraqi refugees at that time at up to 500 000, but there exist no independent 
verification of this figure
18
. According to the written media and to interviews, this 
group was demographically heterogeneous: it was composed of a large number of 
                                                   
16
  The Jordanian monarch personally gave asylum to a handful of Iraqi officials during the 1990s. For 
ordinary people, Jordan had allowed the UNHCR to receive asylum applications, to determine refugee status, and to 
put in place a procedure for refugee resettlement. Through formal written agreement, which could however be 
revoked, the Jordanian government had committed itself to recognising the protection mandate of the UNHCR with 
respect to asylum seekers and refugees, to consider them as temporary residents (pending resettlement) with a legal 
status thus without giving them the right to work or to social benefits. For a number of reasons (see Chatelard, 2002), 
very few Iraqis approach the UNHCR in Jordan by comparison with the size of the flow and the number of those who, 
having transited Jordan, launched asylum applications in a western country. 
17
  The argument runs against Sirkeci (2005) who identifies Turkey as the main transit country for Iraqis 
engaged in international migration. However the author does not give consideration to other transit countries 
neighbouring Iraq.  
18
  International organisations focussed their efforts on the reception and repatriation of foreign workers who 
had left Iraq, whereas the Jordanian government had to deal with the arrival or return of 350,000 of its citizens who 
had left the Gulf states. While there are demographic and socio-economic data for these two groups of displaced 
people, Iraqi refugees from this period can only be discussed qualitatively. 
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families including men and women and all age groups. There are however indications 
to suggest that it was rather homogeneous in socio-economic terms: urban people 
belonging to the upper-middle class using their previous knowledge of and 
connections in Jordan, but also less well-off members of the middle class who could 
still afford what they viewed as temporary migration pending a solution to the conflict 
and who capitalised on the strength of the Iraqi dinar vis-à-vis the Jordanian 
currency.  
 
Among this initial current, class, gender and some confessional variables played a 
role in orienting subsequent migration patterns and in timing secondary migration. 
People who were already used to intercontinental mobility, and had capital and 
assets outside Iraq did not wait for the outcome of the conflict before undertaking the 
procedures necessary to a distant outmigration. Among the group of people who did 
not have access to significant financial capital and who were not in the habit of 
travelling internationally, two separate migratory trends emerged, each following 
directions taken by previous migrants. One of them was mainly composed of single 
men who undertook what was often an individual labour migration towards another 
Arab state. The other was mainly composed of families who left for destinations – the 
UK, North America or Australia – where they already had relatives, which is a reason 
why Christians were over-represented in this group. Starting from Jordan as a waiting 
zone, these projects took varying amount of time to be realised, in some cases over 
a year for each individual. Both motivations and the intended duration of migration 
shifted: it was no longer a matter of seeking protection from conflict but rather the aim 
was to protect oneself from the excesses of a dictatorial regime that had showed its 
brutality in the repression of the Shi'ite and Kurdish uprisings in 1991, or to safeguard 
a lifestyle which was threatened now that international embargo was imposed upon 
Iraq. Those who saw no prospect for short term success in their secondary migration 
plans, and considered that they had nothing to fear from the regime, returned to Iraq 
as of 1992, sometimes to leave again in the following years.   
 
The migratory currents of the years 1992-2002 were grafted on this initial large scale 
population mouvement. Those who had succeeded in leaving Iraq for western 
countries were followed by a large number of members of the intelligentsia and highly 
qualified people in advanced industrial or technological fields, and members of 
professions who were not closely associated with the regime. This drain on brains 
and capital took place along the patterns of classical chain migration, using family 
solidarities to by-pass the difficulties related to departure from Iraq and entry and 
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residence in a western country. Male labour migration to Arab countries also 
accelerated in the first years of the embargo. Migrants included doctors and 
surgeons, engineers, lawyers, higher education teachers, journalists, translators etc, 
many of them working in the public sector in Iraq. They left in search of better 
salaries at a time when their purchasing power in Iraq was collapsing. Jordan granted 
residency permits linked to work contracts to 15 000 – 20 000 of them. Many 
thousands more left across Jordan for Yemen and Libya
19
. Some found the 
necessary funds to bring their wives and children out of Iraq, but most simply 
transferred part of their salaries to Iraq to support their families. This flow never 
completely dried up but its volume diminished. On the one hand, as early as 1993 as 
it became increasingly difficult for this group to leave Iraq: the financial capacity of its 
members was reduced just at a time when the cost of migration increased. On the 
other hand, Libya effectively stopped recruiting Iraqis after 1997 and, by contrast with 
Yemen, it was impossible to go there without having first obtained a work contract. In 
Yemen, there were also fewer opportunities in the labour market. Jordan, which had 
stopped issuing work permits to Iraqis as early as 1995, became the buffer which 
these migrants kept hitting as they continued to leave Iraq in the following years. 
Many remained in Jordan in an irregular situation after having overstayed their 6-
month temporary permit and worked in the informal labour market, well below their 
qualifications. Their professional profile became increasingly diversified: in 1999-
2002 people who in Iraq had been petty traders or clerks, or even skilled craftsmen, 
such as bakers and garage mechanics were found working informally in Jordan. 
They were also increasingly dispersed throughout Jordan, no longer just 
concentrated in the main urban zones, but also working in small towns and villages in 
the rural areas where their skills (such as car mechanics) were in short supply.  
 
Circular migration from Iraq to Jordan and back to maintain a legal status as 
temporary visitor was only possible for those whose work was sufficiently well paid in 
Jordan to enable them to repeatedly pay the exit tax from Iraq. In the meantime, 
large numbers of circular migrants crossed the border regularly, in particular bus and 
taxi drivers and traders (both categories often overlapping) who benefited from 
special permits. Evaluation of the size of stocks and flows are complicated by these 
constant circulations and make Jordanian statistics on entry and exit of Iraqis difficult 
                                                   
19
  Yemen had an open entry and residence policy for Arab nationals. Its economy was not thriving but it 
lacked highly skilled people, which was also the case in Libya in the more favourable context of an oil-based 
economy.  
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to handle. The multiple trajectories of migrants who sought income and legality and 
tried their luck in Jordan, then Libya, then Yemen and back to Jordan, sometimes 
with visits to Iraq, added to migration project to the west which some implemented 
also complexify the picture. Few of those, however,  approached the Amman office of 
the UNHCR: the asylum route to international migration was deemed to dangerous 
for families left in Iraq and for individuals who might want to return there at a later 
stage.   
In the migration currents describes above, sectarian variables only played at the 
margin: there were no specific Shi'ite or Sunni migration patterns, while not all 
Christians could or wanted to rely upon communal institutions or previous patterns of 
intercontinental migration. Strategies were generally based on class and professional 
assets.  
 
By contrats, a last current of politicised and religiously-oriented Shi'ite migrants 
displayed specific sectarian characteristics. It was initially provoked by the Shi’ite 
uprising in 1991, its repression and its repercussions in the late 1990s.  It started 
modestly as early as 1991 but became significant from 1996 onwards
20
. Adult Shi’ite 
men came first, but this migration, like the labour trend of the earlier years, was 
transformed into a chain family migration. Unlike male migrants from the previous 
current, these politicised Shi'ites arrived in numbers in Jordan at a time when labour 
migration towards other Arab states was closed because of the saturation of the 
labour markets in Yemen or Libya. Those interviewed in Amman in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s stated however that they were not disposed toward migrating to 
majority Sunni Arab countries where they could not assert openly their religious 
identities. In the same time, communal links of members of this group with the west 
were weak for lack of previous migratory history. The UK, where Iraqi Shi'ite 
institution existed, stood as an exception. As a general rule these ties only benefited 
those strongly involved in religious institutions, in particular clerics or theological 
students, whose regular or clandestine migration to the UK was financially supported 
by these institutions (see Chatelard, 2004). The 30 000 or so refugees resettled from 
Rafha in Saudi Arabia were the primary force that attracted Shi’ites waiting in Jordan 
to the countries where the former had been resettled in a western country. This was 
done through the legal channel of family reunion, or, when this channel was not 
                                                   
20
  The number of politicised Shi'ite migrants (mostly affiliated with the Da'wa party) peaked in 1996 during 
the repressions that followed an assassination attempt against Udai, Saddam Hussein’s son. It peaked again in 1998 
during the American bombing campaign on Iraq, and in 1999 during the confrontations between the Iraqi authorities 
and Shi’ite political groups (Luizard 2002: 160, 187, 189). 
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available or too long to activate, those resettled supplied others with the means for 
clandestine migration. Others were able to join the Shi’ites communities in Syria and, 
beyond that, in Lebanon or sometimes in Iran. Those who failed to mobilise sufficient 
social and/or financial capital remained immobilised in Jordan or were expelled to 
Iraq. Politicised Iraqi Shi'ites represented the vast majority of those who registered 
with the UNHCR in Amman
21
. Based on their own accounts, they approached the 
UNHCR in the absence of other prospects for secondary migration, because they 
could claim family reunion through that channel with those resettled from Rafha, 
because they had no intention to return to Iraq under the existing regime, and in an 
attempt to secure a degree of protection from the Jordanian authorities who looked 
unfavorably at their presence in Jordan. But many who registered with the UNHCR 
also activated other channels to facilitate their secondary migration.  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the distinction between the different currents was 
increasingly difficult to make. Jordan was a waiting zone for people involved in chain 
family migration, for Christians whose migration dynamics also relied upon communal 
solidarities, and for individuals awaiting family reunions within a refugee regime. In a 
saturated informal labour market, Iraqis of various socioeconomic and 
political/sectarian profiles were in competition for jobs with each other, with Egyptian 
labour migrants and with the poorest Jordanians. Most crucially, political risk added 
up to economic risk: adult men whose situation was irregular were liable to be 
expelled to Iraq at any time, whereas political opponents and asylum seekers 
registered with the UNHCR were living in fear of the Iraqi secret services who, 
according to persistent rumours, operated in Jordan. For all these reasons, the very 
large numbers of Iraqis who did not benefit from a long-term residency and work 
permit did not consider Jordan a safe country. Migrants used all the possible means 
to continue their journeys towards the safety which they hoped for. Means were 
available due to the integration of the country in international communication and 
transport networks, and the presence of several foreign embassies. 
 
2.2.4 Iran 
 
Iran, a signatory to international refugee conventions that pursued a policy of 
systematic asylum-granting for individuals arriving from Iraq, was the only asylum 
                                                   
21
  In July 2003, the UNHCR estimated that, out of an estimated 300,000 Iraqis in Jordan ,“80% were Shi’ites 
originating from the Centre and Southern regions” (UNHCR 2003a; figures pre-dating the April 2003 American 
invasion). 
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country among Iraq’s neighbours. However, Iraqis were granted asylum along 
various categories. Those who arrived between 1991 and 2003 were granted the 
status of involuntary migrants (mohajerin) which entitled them to stay indefinitely on 
the territory but confined them to certain types of employment, limited their access to 
social services and did not entitle them to a travel document. Iraqis who had arrived 
in earlier periods had usually been granted the status of fully fledged refugee 
(panahandegran) justified by the fact that they had been denied Iraqi citizenship and 
were thus stateless
22
. In all cases the refugees were not compelled to remain in a 
camp if they could find an Iranian national or another refugee legally settled outside a 
camp to act as guarantor. Thus the number of Iraqis in camps remained very low 
(about 10% of all refugees, concentrated in the border regions of Khuzistan and 
Iranian Kurdistan) (Rajaee, 2000). 
 
By comparison with the period preceding the Gulf War, many new trends emerged in 
Iraqi emigration towards Iran, in particular the mass arrival of Marsh Arabs between 
1991 and 1994 (Babakhan, 1994; AIJ-FIDH, 2002; Clark and Magee, 2001; HRW, 
2003) . By contrast with earlier waves of refugees, the new arrivals were of rural 
background and originally strongly socialised within a kinship system. These ties 
were dismantled with the destruction of their villages, imprisonments or 
assassinations and forced migration in different directions (within Iraq and towards 
Iran). Lacking previous social connections in Iran, most of them were unable to leave 
the camps which provided them with very limited economic opportunities. On the 
other hand these farmers and herders had no professional skills suited to the 
demands of the labour market of southern Iran where the main economic activities 
focused on the requirements of the petroleum industry or trade; earlier arrivals from 
Iraq had taken up the available positions, and Afghan refugees (who numbered 2 
million in Iran at the time) were occupying the unskilled jobs in agriculture or 
construction. Finally the very low educational levels of these refugees prevented 
them from turning their Arab identity, often perceived negatively by non-Arabs in Iran, 
into a religious or cultural asset, as several members of the groups who had arrived 
earlier had done by joining the institutions of the great religious centres in Qom, 
Mashhed or Ispahan (interviews, Teheran and Qom, 2002).  
 
                                                   
22
  The Iranian authorities variously included the panahandegan in the figures of Iraqi refugees they 
publicized. Hence there could be very important discrepancies in numbers of Iraqi refugees depending on the 
sources (UNHCR, Iranian government, or NGOs). 
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All these factors combined to explain why many Ma’dan refugees in camps were 
recruited as fighters into the Badr Brigade
23
. The Brigade played an integrative role 
for these refugees, helping them out the camps and social and economic 
marginalisation (interviews, Khouzestan, 2002). Among these refugees, there was 
also a very high proportion of elderly people and women without male relatives, with 
or without their children. Demographics reflected the outcome of the repression 
exerted by the Iraqi security apparatus that targeted adult men, but also the fact that 
many men had died on the battlefield during the Iran-Iraq war (Le Roy, 2001). 
Without a working-age male head-of-household to rely upon, the camp context 
allowed them to cope thanks to the assistance provided by the Iranian authorities and 
NGOs, including those connected with the Iraqi Shi’ite exiled opposition, which also 
recruited medical personnel and teachers among trained refugees. As a general rule, 
Iraqis arriving after 1990 were more dependent than earlier arrivals on the networks 
and structures belonging to the Iraqi Shi’ite Islamist parties for their economic and 
social support. 
 
Another new trend specific to the Ma’dan was that several thousands of them evaded 
registration, preferring to keep away from official institutions and camps. Villagers or 
members of kinship groups who had fled collectively or had managed to regroup 
once in Iran called on common tribal ties with Iranian Arabs, the majority ethnic group 
in Khuzestan. They established informal settlement near villages where residents 
belonged to the same tribal confederation. They were not at risk of expulsion back to 
Iraq, but several were re-categorised by the authorities as mohajerin and sent to a 
camp (interviews, Khuzestan, 2002).  
 
The cumulative effect of a number of social handicaps maintained the Marsh Arabs 
very much on the margins of Iranian society while immobilising them in Iran. The vast 
majority of them had neither the financial means nor the social networks to consider 
long distance emigration to the west. But maybe the factor that played the major role 
in keeping them inside Iran is that western countries were foreign to their mental 
universe. Out of the two dozen interviews conducted in 2002 in Khouzestan with 
people originating from the Iraqi Marshes, none expressed a desire to leave Iran, 
except to return to Iraq should there be a change of regime or to contribute to 
                                                   
23
  This militia, the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the main 
Shi’it opposition movement to the Ba’athist regime and favourable to the Iranian revolution, was based in Khuzistan 
from where it ran operations into Iraq (Luizard, 2002: 191-192). 
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bringing about that change. These refugees were indeed the first to massively return 
to Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall in April 2003.  
The Ma’dan were not the only Iraqis to seek refuge in Iran during that period. The 
victims of the April 1991 repression of the Shi’ite uprising and of the hunt for Shi’ite 
Islamist opponents, which continued well beyond that period, had a profile more 
typical of middle class refugees; they were either urbanites from Basra, Nasiriyah or 
Amarah who had migrated from the countryside to the cities in the 1970s, or rural 
people from areas in the south of Iraq other than the Marshes. This group did not find 
in the Iran of the 1990s the same socio-economic opportunities that had been 
available to refugees from earlier decades. The recession which started during the 
Iran-Iraq war limited employment opportunities in the petroleum industry as well as in 
manual work and petty trade which had, until then, been the main sectors of 
economic activity for the least educated Iraqi refugees particularly concentrated in 
Khuzestan and southern neighborhoods of Teheran. Moreover the new Iranian 
government under President Khatami elected in 1997 shifted from a pan-islamist 
outlook to domestic priorities. This materialised, among others, through the 
introduction of restrictive measures aimed at the mohajerin: the list of prohibited 
professional activities was broadened, material support and social assistance were 
reduced etc (Al-Meehy, 2004; Frelick, 1999). However, unlike Afghan refugees, who 
were the main targets of these measures, Iraqi mohajerin were not subjected to 
incentives to return to their home country.  
 
With the exception of the religious elites and the political leadership (two partially 
overlapping groups) whose modes of re-socialisation, economic insertion and 
relations to the Iranian state and society followed different dynamics (Luizard, 2002: 
235-236), the Iraqi Shi'ite refugees who arrived after 1990 were more economically 
and socially vulnerable than those of the previous period. They lacked a social base 
acting as a shield against the measures which limited their access to the labour 
market and to social benefits except when they were able (and willing) to fit into the 
political, military and social structures of the exiled opposition. Educated and urban 
middle class refugees were those most likely to be tempted by a departure to Europe 
or Australia now that Iraqi Shi’ite diasporas were in formation there. In certain cases, 
Iraqis in Iran activated the legal channels of family reunion, available with the 
mediation of the UNHCR. In other cases, they followed the well trodden route of 
clandestine migration to Europe via Turkey which had been developed by Afghans 
and Iranians themselves. Finally, some pioneered the clandestine route to Australia 
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via Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia, particularly after 1999. Here again, the people 
most likely to be involved in intercontinental migration were those who could make 
beneficial use of their relationship with relatives or friends already exiled in liberal 
asylum countries, sometimes in order to accumulate the financial capital needed for a 
very expensive migration process. At other times, capital was accumulated while 
working in Iran. (Interviews, Iran, 2002 and internet correspondance in following 
years).  
 
Some Assyrian Christians from Iraq, mostly originating from the north of the country, 
also preferred to seek security in Iran over that period and joined the Assyrian Iranian 
community in the region of Urmieh (Western Azerbaijan Province). On the other 
hand, not all the Kurds who had fled during the mass exodus of 1991 and 
subsequent strifes in Iraqi Kurdistan returned back in the following years. Many 
remained in the refugee camps of  Western Azerbaijan managed by the Iranian 
authorities and the UNHCR alongside co-ethnics who had taken refuge there during 
the 1988 Al-Anfal campaign. Others were sponsored out the camps by fellow Kurds. 
(Interviews, Western Azerbaijan, 2002 and internet correspondance, 2008). 
 
The specific institutional context of Iran made irregular secondary migration of Iraqis, 
whichever their profile, more difficult, and therefore less frequent, than from Jordan: 
compared to the latter, Iran, a country embargoed by the USA, was relatively more 
isolated from international communication and transport networks whereas up-to-
date technologies for the forging of identity documents was less available than in 
Jordan.   
 
2.2.5 Turkey 
 
In Iraq after 1991, the areas of Kurdistan north of the 36
th
 Parallel were beyond the 
control of the Baghdad government. They had a majority Kurdish population and 
were less affected by the economic impact of the embargo or the coercition of the 
Ba'athist regime. However, these regions were also less economically developed 
than the rest of Iraq and offered limited labour opportunities. Moreover the north also 
suffered from strifes during conflicts with the Iraqi army or internecine struggles 
between Kurdish factions (Graham-Brown, 1999: 206). The northern zone was a 
base for some of the factions opposing the Baghdad regime and attracted Iraqis from 
the centre or the south of the country – army deserters and other refugees – who 
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sought to cross the control line separating the north from the rest of the country. In 
addition, the Ba’athist regime’s policy of Arabisation of the Kirkuk region, just south of 
the  36
th
 Parallel and under Ba'athist control, resulted in new expulsions towards Iraqi 
Kurdistan (AIJ-FIDH, 2002). Additionally populations in both Kirkuk and Mosul areas 
were hit by the economic effects of the sanctions and experienced impoverishment 
that prompted their emigration.  
 
With the northern region as starting point, the outmigration current towards Iran was 
occasional and temporary but when refugees flew it was en masse. Reactive 
mouvements were undertaken mostly by rural Kurds fleeing conflicts with fair 
numbers of them returning to into Iraqi Kurdistan within months. The flow towards 
Turkey was smaller, more regular and more complex: it involved few reactive 
migration, but mainly long term intercontinental migratory projects that turned Turkey 
into a transit country. Alongside Kurds, it concerned a number of Turkmen, Assyrians 
and a limited number of Arabs who often transited through northern Iraq, in particular 
originating from the Kirkuk or Mosul regions. Turkey did not accept asylum claims 
from non European countries. However, Turkmen, who Turkey saw as co-ethnics, 
were at times granted access to nationality or at least to residence rights (Frelick, 
1997). For others, clandestinity and a more or less long transit period were the norm 
(Içduygu, 2000 and 2003). A large number of both Christians and Kurds remained in 
urban centers in Turkey, mostly in Istanbul, where they did not abandon their projects 
of further migration but were immobilized long-term without a legal status and forced 
to look for livelihoods opportunities in the informal sector, often relying on potentially 
exploitative group solidarities (Danis, 2004b).  
 
Ethnic or ethno-religious identities were a determining factor for the next step of the 
journey. A very small proportion of migrants joined the international refugee circuit (ie 
application with the UNHCR followed by resettlement). Assyrians and Chaldeans, 
who used the same underground human smuggling networks as the Kurds to reach 
Istanbul, then relied on religious solidarity for their next move (Mannaert, 2003; 
Içduygu and Toktas 2002). Chaldeans used churches, priests and catholic charity 
organisations and activated family reunion or sponsorship schemes to reach 
Australia, the UK, or Canada (Danis, 2004a and 2008). Very few Kurds joined the 
Australian or North American circuits: by contrast with Christians, this group had no 
history of emigration to these destinations and, by contrast with Shi’ite Arabs, no new 
foci were established in the 1990s. The Kurds fled to Iran in 1991 at the time of the 
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repression of their uprising while resettlement schemes for Iraqi refugees operated 
from Arab states which did not grant Iraqis asylum. By relying on the structures of the 
exiled political associations and parties and on kinship ties Iraqi Kurds had, since the 
Halabja episode in 1988, used the European migratory circuit and followed Turkish 
Kurds who had been using this route since the 1970s (Cigerli, 1998; Faist, 2000; 
King 2005). In the 1990s there was a process of redistribution of Kurdish migration to 
Europe due to changes in migration and asylum regimes: alongside such previous 
asylum countries as Germany and Sweden, the UK, Greece, and Italy became new 
destinations, the latter being also used for transit (Griffiths, 2002; Papadopoulou, 
2004; Wahlbeck, 1998). However, a very large number of Kurds remained stranded 
in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul.  
 
2.3 From the regional to the global 
 
In 2002, in addition to an estimated 870,000 Iraqi migrants in the Middle East (see 
introduction to section 2), the UNHCR reported that 180,000 Iraqis were living as 
registered refugees in a western countries (including nearly 150,000 in Europe) while 
over 80,000 were still asylum seekers, waiting for their status to be determined. 
Another 70,000 who had arrived in the early 1990s had been granted citizenship and 
had thus disappeared from refugee statistics in the following years. Combined figures 
of refugees and asylum seekers having launched their claims in asylum countries, 
refugees resettled from host countries around Iraq, former refugees having accesses 
citizenship, and Iraqis staying within a migration regime as residents or students 
showed that one third of all Iraqis who had left Iraq between 1990 and 2001-2002 
were living in a western country. However, Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers as 
they appeared in the statistical abstracts published by the UNHCR were dispersed in 
more than 90 countries: two main poles – Iran and Western Europe – clearly stood 
out, followed by two secondary poles – North America and the Pacific (Australia and 
New Zealand) (UNHCR 2003a, 200b and 2003c).  
 
At the global level, and compared with the previous period, the patterns of Iraqi 
migratory movements and loci of transit, regroupement and settlement had become 
far more complex. A large number of Iraqi migrants had travelled along routes used 
by previous exiled co-nationals, and the main urban poles had become more 
important as bases for exiled political opposition (case of Teheran and London) or as 
interface between Iraqis from the “inside” and the “outside” (case of Amman or, 
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possibly, Kuwait). However, in the early 2000s Iraqi migrants were found on every 
continent. The dispersal of the Shi’ite community was particularly remarkable, 
overlapping in part with the scattered migration patterns of Assyrians which had 
retained the same features throughout the 20
th
 Century. For both communities, 
besides Australia, the UK or the USA, new migratory poles appeared in Northern 
Europe (Sweden in particular). New poles emerged largely as a factor of the policy 
choices of state actors within the international refugee regime, eventually prompting 
chain migration in family and at times communal patterns. Migration out of the Middle 
East developed based on two types of trans-national networks: the social networks of 
migrants and those of migrant smugglers. The trend was continuous when national 
asylum systems were favourable to Iraqis but it slowed down dramatically and either 
came to a halt or changed direction when target states shifted to less favourable 
asylum policies, as was the case with Germany in 1994 (Gibney, 2001) and Australia 
in 2001 (Tazreiter, 2003). 
 
If attention is focused on the movements of Iraqi migrants and their direction rather 
than on their focal points for transit or settlement, striking features are the high level 
of multipolarity, the multiplicity of transit stages and, at almost every stage, the 
multiple redirecting of the flows. Measures adopted by the wealthiest blocks of states 
(Western Europe, North America, Australia/New Zealand) to control the entry of 
undesirable immigrants on their territory affected the mechanisms of irregular 
migration in different ways: they made migrants' journeys increasingly more tortuous 
and longer, they multiplied the number of transit stages on the way to final 
destinations, and they created buffer zones at the immediate periphery of wealthier 
regions where a very large number of undocumented migrants of different 
nationalities, including Iraqis, were waiting, unable to access countries of their choice 
and unwilling or unable to return to a previous transit stage or to their home countries 
(Andreas and Snyder, 2000; Nevis, 2002; Oxfam, 2002)
24
. In these “buffer countries” 
(Turkey, Eastern and central European states, Mexico, Indonesia, various small 
Pacific states), Iraqi migrants had regrouped in urban centers, sometimes in camps 
under forcible pressure from local authorities, alongside migrants from other 
nationalities. A specific migration set-up had developed in these locations that 
included mostly informal communal networks, more or less structured illegal activities 
of identity document forgers and migrant smugglers, but also international 
                                                   
24
  Additional security measures at borders and pre-borders that states have introduced after September 11, 
2001 have reinforced the phenomenon but have not brought irregular migration to a halt. 
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organisations (the UNHCR, the IOM, etc.). In many cases in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, national legislations were modified either to prevent further entry of migrants 
from countries that produced asylum-seekers on their way to wealthier states (case 
of Indonesia under Australian pressure), or to adopt a domestic refugee legislation 
(case of Mexico, for eg). The granting of asylum in these buffer countries did fix some 
Iraqis there for a shorter or longer period. However it is questionable that those still 
immobilised in buffer countries at the time of writing (2009) have come to the end of 
their emigration cycle in these new asylum states where social and economic 
opportunities are not favourable to the long-term settlement of refugees. Thus it is 
very likely that the attraction of their social networks will persuade Iraqis who benefit 
from this status – in Mexico or Ukraine, for example - to return to the Middle East or 
to try their luck once more towards a western country. In the medium-term, the 
formation of new stable Iraqi exile communities in buffer countries remains unlikely.  
 
3 The social variables of Iraqi migration 
 
A number of scholars who have focused on the role of social networks in migratory 
dynamics have noted that the social structures in the migrants’ place of origin serve 
as bases underlying and supporting networks which take a trans-national dimension. 
These same authors suggest that a migratory movement acquires its international 
dimension when the members of the social networks engaged in migration projects 
are collectively able to transform their local assets into trans-national one; particular 
examples of this argument are found in T. Faist (2000), who discusses the case of 
Turkish Kurds, and A. Monsutti (2005) who has examined the case of the Hazara of 
Afghanistan.  
 
In Iraq, migratory experiences were thought of not in universalistic, national or 
statutory terms (as Iraqis, as refugees, as labour migrants), but along pre-existing 
terms of class stratification and discrimination/coercition along political, ethno-
religious or kin-based lines. Those had been reinforced or created by the action of 
the Iraqi regime on society, especially as of 1991 (Abdul-Jabar, 2002; Abdul-Jabar 
and Dawod 2002), and by the effects of the economic blockade. These affiliations 
could also be the cause for marginalisation in a number of national contexts along 
the migratory journey, especially in countries neighbouring Iraq. Conversely, they 
could provide migrants with greater access to safety than did their national identities 
(as Iraqi or Arab) in situations where states were trying to limit their commitments to 
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refugee protection and/or adopted a protectionist labour migration regime. Such 
social units could be subject to impoverishment, marginalisation, discrimination or 
persecution from the part of states or other social groups, but could also be factors of 
cohesion and action, and loci where to mobilise resources to ensure individual safety; 
in other words they could be altogether the cause of and the instrument for migration. 
Migratory patterns at the global level, as well as their modalities (irregularity, legality, 
a combination of both, migration within an asylum or an immigration regime etc.), 
their stages and temporalities and the destinations sought, whether reached or not, 
depended on the configuration of, and types of assets offered to individuals by these 
social units at any given moment.  
 
3.1 Entitlements and representation 
 
Legal statuses available to Iraqi migrants in each regional context were determined 
by the political and policy choices made by receptions countries and did not match 
the causalities of the migration. From the point of view of the Iraqis interviewed in 
regional destination countries and beyond, the optimal configuration to ensure their 
satisfactory long-term residence should have included all the following parameters: 
- Physical security guaranteed by the authorities of the host country (no forced 
return to Iraq, protection from the activities of the Iraqi security services in the 
host country, fair access to justice and, more generally, rule of law);  
- Access to legal employment as well as sufficient demand in the sectors of 
interest to Iraqis, namely skilled labour and the professions;  
- Access to social benefits (health, education, housing etc.) and support 
structures (government, NGOs, communal/religious and international 
organisations); 
- Freedom of expression: cultural (as members of an ethnic or linguistic group, 
but also as Iraqis), political (for the different groups opposing the Ba’athist 
regime), religious (for the Shi’ites, Sunnis, Christians of different sects and 
other small communities); 
- The possibility of maintaining relations with significant social groups (family, 
party comrades, other Iraqi nationals, co-religionists etc.) in and out of the 
host country. 
A very small proportion of the Iraqis interviewed expressed the view that all these 
conditions were met in any of their regional country of emigration. Beyond identifiable 
divides between countries that guaranteed Iraqis stable, safe and lasting residence 
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on their territory (Iran) and those who did not (Saudi Arabia), an additional divide was 
between available regimes inside a single country: in some cases (Jordan), labour 
migration regimes were available for a selected group of Iraqis while the rest of the 
migrants could not access any form of legal residence. However, in any given 
regional context, legal conditions and the practices of gouvernements and societies 
discriminated Iraqis along class, political and “primordialised” (ethnic, religious, 
kinship-based) identities, even when migrants did not claim them.  
 
The crucial question was less that of the rights of migrants and refugees in Middle 
Eastern countries than that of the nature of the region’s political systems and their 
impact on migrants. Advocacy for improved rights and entitlements was everywhere 
affected by the political outlooks of receptions states vis-à-vis the Iraqi regime, and 
vis-à-vis certain political, ethnic or religious groups. Whatever the level of legality of 
their stay, Iraqi migrants or refugees in the countries of the region were never in a 
position to negotiate improved collective entitlements with the national agencies  that 
managed them. There was also from no to little room in the public sphere for national 
advocacy organisations of the reception countries to speak in the name of Iraqis. Iran 
was the only country where a degree of advocacy for improved assistance in camps 
was possible, such advocacy being undertaken by the exiled Shi'ite political 
leadership. Neither the Kurds nor the Assyrians from Iraq were included in these 
initiatives. An additional element was that Iraqis in the various receptions countries 
around Iraq were themselves fragmented along strong class lines, various 
experiences that had prompted the migratory decision, political outlook, and, at 
times, religious or ethnic affiliations. Under these conditions, and irrespective of the 
reception policies adopted by regional states, there existed no unified Iraqi exile 
community in any given reception country to speak in the name of an Iraqi migrant 
constituency. The UNHCR, on the other hand, was not in a position to play its 
universal role of advocacy and protection for all refugees across social categories in 
countries that made its operations conditional at best on restrictive memoranda of 
understanding. An additional impediment to the organisation's capacity was that 
relatively few Iraqis sought asylum for fear of possible retribution over family 
members at home.  
 
3.2 Family-based dynamics 
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The family unit (defined loosely and not necessarily as a household in economic 
terms) was the smaller unit liable of suffering threats at the hands of the Iraqi regime 
along logics of collective responsibility and punishment embedded in a patriarcal and 
kin-based view of the sociopolitical order.  Even those families whose political loyalty 
was not questioned, and whose members did not face direct physical threats, 
incurred risks to their social and economic integrity: the impeded international 
mobility of individuals and circulation of information and capital flows between Iraq 
and the rest of the world fragmented families and prevented labour migrants to 
effectively support households back home an maintain ties. This is why, in many 
cases, Iraqis based their migration decision on two main considerations: concern for 
their own and their family’s safety, and a desire to regroup with dispersed family 
members (generally members of the nuclear family). For the majority of the migrants 
interviewed, these two objectives played a cumulative role. As a result, even for 
those who benefited from the best possible legal and socio-economic conditions in a 
given location, global patterns of family relations played a role in their decision to 
continue migrating and in the choice of the next destination. Chain family migration 
was operational: with respect to reaching western countries, the process was initiated 
by earlier migrants, either those who had arrived before the Gulf war or primary 
migrants who benefited from refugee resettlement programmes after 1991. In most 
cases, family-based migration strategies spanned several countries and extended 
over several years. However, many families remained geographically scattered with 
members living in different contexts of opportunities and under different legal 
statuses.   
 
Liberal social and economic contexts enabled migrants who had achieved security 
and stability in their countries of settlement to assist those who were in countries 
near Iraq with the financial or institutional/legal means to join them or to continue 
their migration to another destination. These means included the sending of funds (in 
particular to finance the costs of clandestine or semi-regular migration), intervention 
on their behalf with humanitarian organisations or churches that operated refugee 
sponsorship schemes, the activation of family reunion programmes, and marriages 
allowing the acquisition of a visa. 
 
In the impeded context of communications and exchanges that linked Iraq with the 
rest of the world, it also happened that the pull exerted by family members remaining 
in Iraq on relatives staying in regional countries counterbalanced the pull for 
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secondary migration exerted by family members settled in the west. This was 
especially true for Jordan where cross border taxi and bus drivers (as well as traders) 
played a primary role in the circulation of information between family members. An 
informal mechanism for the transfer of funds (hawala) also existed, going through the 
same channels and with rules and guarantees based on trust, honour and reputation. 
Thus, many migrants who found the conditions of their stay there acceptable (if not 
optimal), opted for remaining despite the fact that they could have migrated to a 
country offering better legal and economic opportunities. Maintenance of links (for eg 
by sending remittances) with relatives remaining in Iraq was given priority over other 
concerns. When circumstances allowed, families consciously planned strategic 
dispersal: one or several members of the family remained in Jordan, to act as 
interface for communications and links for transfers of funds from other Arab 
countries or the west. 
 
Within family units of various sizes, roles were distributed by taking into consideration 
levels of potential risk depending on age, sex and family status: among a group of 
brothers, for example, a single adult would stay in Jordan to maintain contact with 
elderly parents in Iraq, whereas his married brothers and his single sisters would be 
given priority to migrate further afield. Depending on the migratory channels chosen 
by families (who often combined several available ones), primary migrants were not 
necessarily heads of households or adult sons. In a number of extreme cases we 
documented, a single daughter or an underage son was sent to Jordan to apply for 
refugee status with the UNHCR. Alternatively, relatives mobilised funds to pay for 
their clandestine migration to a western country where they launched asylum claims. 
Such decision were made by taking into consideration the better chances such 
individuals had of being granted refugee status, the priority usually given by refugee 
organisations in the processing of so-called vulnerable cases, and therefore the 
possibility of speeding up the process of family reunion.  
 
3.3 Communal/corporate-based dynamics 
 
Communal or corporate-based migration strategies could also be adopted by those 
able and willing to rely on social networks which had already acquired, or were in the 
process of acquiring, a transnational scope and that had a degree of organisational 
structure. Consider the three following cases. That of Iraqi Kurds who arrived 
irregularly in Germany to seek asylum and managed their journey across borders 
46 
 
and national territories through the networks and staging posts established during 
earlier decades by Turkish Kurds and through cross-border family networks (Içduyglu 
and Toktas, 2002 : 25-54). That of the Shi’ites from southern Iraq who took refuge in 
Saudi Arabia, were confined in a camp because of their communal affiliations, and 
were then resettled in the USA with the mediation of the UNHCR. A large number 
regrouped spontaneously in the suburbs of Detroit (Dearborne in particular) where 
Shi'ite community organisations had been created by Lebanese co-religionists after 
their arrival during the civil war in their country (1975-1991). Iraqi Shi'ites used these 
communal structures and solidarities before establishing their own institutions and 
gained rapid knowledge of the legal and irregular means through which to secure the 
chain migration of family members who had taken refuge in Jordan or Syria and even 
in Iran (Al-Hakim, 2001: 3-19; Grieco, 2003 ; Patrick, 2002; Shoeb et ali 2007; 
correspondences USA, 2003-2006). Finally that of Iraqis of all sectarian and ethnic 
affiliations who approached Christian churches liable to sponsor the next stage of 
their migration towards a western country, to the extent that some of them formally 
converted in Amman, Istanbul or Kuala Lumpur (Danis 2008; interviews and 
correspondences 2001-2003). 
 
Religious-communal ties in countries of first migration in the region could be 
mobilised to ensure livelihoods, mutual social support, financial assistance or moral 
and spiritual help within congregations, and sometimes mediation with the country’s 
authorities and the UNHCR (Danis 2004a and 2008 for Christians in Istanbul; 
Chatelard 2004 for Shi'ites in Jordan). Communal connections were also used to 
travel between countries of the Middle East by using religious centres: between 
Jordan and Syria for both Christians and Shi’ites and, for the latter, between Syria 
and Lebanon and between all these countries and Iran. Concerning the Kurds, 
existing studies demonstrate that this role was played by such corporate groups as 
political organisations (Papadopoulou 2004) and kinship groups (King 2005), acting 
as relays for migration and for moral support and re-socialisation, particularly in 
European countries whereas they were transit stages or countries of durable 
settlement. 
 
In all cases, these connections facilitated or assisted long-distance migration to 
places where communal regrouping was possible. In the vast majority of the cases 
we documented, individuals stated that their aim in seeking support from communal 
or corporate institutions and groups was to achieve family reunion or to ensure that 
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each member of a family unit could reach and stay in a secure location. Individuals 
asserted communal or partisan identities either through genuine commitment or as 
instrumental at a given time and in a given place. However, even if 
communal/corporate-based processes were used to achieve family-based objectives, 
accessing resources and security through these institutions and networks had an 
impact on group identities and on the relationships of individuals with 
communal/corporate groups by creating or strengthening dependency and moral 
indebtedness. The result is that collective identities asserted instrumentally at one 
stage of the migratory trajectory could solidify, and be transformed and maintained 
after the instrumental stage.  
 
3.4 The class variable 
 
Nicholas Van Hear's consideration of “class” in migration demonstrates that the 
patterns and direction of mouvements of migrants fleeing situations of conflict at 
home can be partly or largely determined by their socioeconomic background (Van 
Hear 2004). This argument proves true in the case of migration from Iraq between 
1991 and 2002/2003. Financial, professional and education assets as forms of 
capital were important additional variables at play in the capacity of Iraqis to migrate 
and in the direction and spatial scope of their migration, albeit not the only variables 
and not independent ones.  
 
Professional and educational backgrounds were at one and the same time reasons 
for, impediments to and assets for migration. The economic impact of the embargo 
drastically affected the livelihoods of members of the educated middle-class who 
were also the objects of regulatory measures aimed at preventing their outmigration. 
Yet those who were educated were also more likely to belong to extended families 
who could free financial capital to pay for the cost of their exit from Iraq. Finally, they 
were also the ones who could expect to find labour contracts as skilled professionals 
in selected Arab countries and send remittances back home. This situation held true 
as long as employment policies in Jordan, Yemen or Libya were favourable to 
educated Iraqis. Hence the time variable combined with the class variable explains 
why the migration trend to Libya came to a halt in the second half of the 1990s while 
the trend to Yemen was reduced, and why, after that date, educated middle-class 
Iraqis were found in ever greater numbers in Jordan in situation of irregularity trying 
to eke out a living in the informal sector. Class played a further role in the spatial 
distribution of the educated middle-class, this time in correlation with the previous 
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migratory histories of families themselves embeded in the Iraqi class structure of 
previous decades. Those migrants who had close relatives established in western 
countries before the 1990s as professionals or businesspeople could find support for 
further migration, especially starting from Jordan, whereas the other ones had to 
remain closer to Iraq and at times opted, more or less willingly, to return there.  
 
However the class determinant remained secondary for many other migrants, 
especially the ones who could or would rely on communal-based solidarities. The 
Assyro-Chaldeans examined by Didem Danis in Istanbul (Danis 2008) belonged to 
the lower or lower middle-class. They had left Iraq to flee situations of dramatic 
impoverishment and, at times, religious-based persecution. They fled through norther 
Iraq and the Turkish border which they crossed irregularly, hence the cost of 
migration did not include the exit tax and the guarantee deposit. They nevertheless 
incurred the cost of clandestine migration mobilised from selling properties in Iraq, or 
from among family members and the religious community. The same situation faced 
those Christians who fled to Iran. Further migration to wealthier countries relied upon 
both family-based and communal-based solidarities. On the other hand, Danis 
contends that Iraqi Kurds staying long-term in Istanbul were stranded and 
marginalised by a combination of ethnopolitical (Turkey preventing the operation of 
Kurdish parties and associations) and class factors.  
 
The class dimension in the migration of politicized or persecuted Shi'ites also played 
a role as a dependant variable. In their case, class was a factor of their position in the 
religious institution they were affiliated to, not of their socioeconomic situation in Iraq. 
The access of the religious elite to further migration opportunities via Jordan was 
prioritized, whereas those less endowed with cultural and symbolic capital (even 
when highly educated) experienced longer transit stages, or eventually left Jordan for 
Syria that had a more favorable policy vis-à-vis religiously-oriented Shi'ites. In Iran, 
the class factor was also embedded in the structure of the religious/political 
community but an addition factor was the urban/rural divide between Ma'dan and 
other Shi'ite migrants, thus shaping different contexts of opportunities in the Islamic 
Republic and prospects of further migration. As a general rule, poorer rural Shi'ites 
remained in great numbers in Iran within refugee camps, whereas the most educated 
ones were in Iranian cities, or experienced a transitory stay in Saudi Arabia or Jordan 
before settling more durably in a western country.  
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Finally, the class dimension was essentiel for those who could not mobilise other 
types of resources (symbolic, religious, ethnic or kin-based) to exit Iraq and who 
remained within Iraq as involuntary “stayees” having to endure economic hardship, or 
as internally displaced fleeing the coercition and persecution exerted by the regime 
and experiencing further impoverishment entailed by displacement. These were a 
large number: internally displaced people were estimated to be 1 million before the 
2003 conflict (Fawcett and Tanner, 2002). Interviews conducted with those who 
migrated to Jordan and Syria after 2003 also testify that the initial wave of migrants 
who left at the time of the Anglo-American invasion (and before sectarian dynamics 
and criminal violence became main reasons for fleeing) were likely to be either close 
associates of the Ba'ath or involuntary stayees of the previous period who belonged 
to the educated middle-class and could realise their wish to migrate only after 
restrictions on exiting Iraq were lifted under the new Iraqi political regime. However, 
this window of opportunities was short-lived and control on exit from Iraq was 
reinstated in a new form as of 2005, while new controls on entry to Syria and Jordan 
were imposed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
An approach in terms of migration order requires to look at migratory flows and 
circulations in several directions, and to also consider remittances of migrants back 
to the home country, circulation of informations between members of diasporas in 
close and distant locations and at home, and return migration. This aspect of an Iraqi 
migration order has been touched upon only marginally in this paper: the isolation of 
Iraq, caused both by international policies of blockade and authoritarian policy of the 
regime on the mouvement of its nationals (either by forcing them to stay or pushing 
them to leave), created a configuration specific to Iraq. Outflows of people where 
more important than circulatory or return migration, and flows of information and 
capital were restricted.    
 
Taken collectively it is very difficult to qualify the motivations of those Iraqi who left 
their country between 1990 and 2003 as either economic or political; these motives 
were rarely mutually exclusive and the categorises used by states or international 
organisations whose mandates are to manage international migration flows or to 
protect refugees do not appear to be the only relevant ones to make sense of the 
patterns and the social organisation of Iraqi migration regionally or globally. 
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Regionally, Iraqi migration patterns were embedded in historical, geopolitical, 
sociological, economic and legal contexts specific to each country and also common 
to a sub-set of countries within the region (Arab countries). As for the global 
distribution of the flows, their size and nature were partly determined by institutional, 
legal and policy factors such as access to, residence in and exit from regional 
countries, other countries in-between the region and countries of asylum in the west, 
and factors governing entry and stay in the west (including through refugee 
resettlement schemes). More characteristic of an Iraqi order of emigration in the 
period between 1990 and early 2003 was the combination of forced migration and 
collective/communal dynamics. This combination was a factor of social dynamics in 
Iraq and in the Middle East more generally. Social units such as the family, the socio-
religious or ethnic group, and the social or professional class were often more 
relevant that the individual to understand migratory trends.  
 
By comparison with the situation prevailing prior to the Gulf war, movements out of 
Iraq had accelerated and the total number of outmigrants had significantly increased. 
On the other hand, the geographical patterns of this migration displayed 
simultaneously a higher concentration of migrants at the regional level and a greater 
dispersal at the global level, a process which can be described as atomisation. 
Similarly, the proportion of Iraqi migrants accepted under various refugee regimes 
(international or domestic) significantly increased, but asylum seekers and registered 
refugees were found mainly in Iran and in western countries, specifically western 
Europe. By contrast, in the Arab states of the Middle East and in Turkey, most Iraqis 
were either regular or irregular migrants within migration regimes. Iran absorbed the 
largest part of the migratory flow, whereas countries which offered neither asylum nor 
secure residence under a migration regime did not contain the flow. However, 
migrants to Iran and other countries were pre-selected along both class, religious and 
political lines. Arguably it is more this pre-selection than the receptions policies 
available that determined secondary migration. Due to Iraq's international isolation, 
migrants’ social networks that facilitated intercontinental moves were more firmly 
established in countries of first migration neighbouring Iraq. These networks were 
mostly operational in Jordan and Turkey, both countries with a high level of 
integration in world exchange and communications systems, and that achieved the 
status of major transit stages for Iraqis. Institutional actors of the international refugee 
regime - the UNHCR and western asylum countries- played a major role in the 
creation of bridgeheads and new migratory poles in western countries through 
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resettlement programmes. It remains that the social networks of migrants were liable 
to play a role at all stages of migration, to the point where the pull of earlier migrants 
persuaded individuals to leave Iraq or encouraged them to undertake secondary 
migration even when neither their economic situation nor their personal safety in Iraq 
or in a specific country of migration were particularly problematic. For many migrants 
or would-be migrants, social networks however represented no more than a potential 
which was, at best, partially actualised.  
 
Current scholarship that focuses on the post-2003 trend of outmigration from Iraq 
views the changes that have affected the Iraqi domestic stage after the 2003 Anglo-
American invasion as having worsened the environment of insecurity in Iraq to the 
point of prompting forced-migration of an unprecedented scale. Whereas it is in fact 
impossible to evaluate with any certainty the size of the flow of migrants and 
refugees who have left Iraq since 2003, it remains that the trend is not new and 
needs to be read as embedded in previous large mouvements of Iraqis that have 
long taken a regional and global scope. Any consideration of possible return trends 
also needs to acknowledge that, when the social organisation of migration is based 
on collective and chain dynamics with a transnational dimension, migratory trends 
might be only marginally affected by such changes in the superstructure as 
improvement in the internal security of the country of origin. The case of the 200,000 
Iraqi refugees (some 50,000 of them assisted by the UNHCR) who returned to Iraq 
from Iran in the months following the fall of the Ba'athist regime does not disprove 
this thesis: those refugees were either the ones whose transnational ties were the 
weakest, or those whose political stakes in the new Iraq were most important. By all 
means, even if domestic stability improves in Iraq, it is more than likely that the 
country will remain for years to come a country of significant outmigration and that 
Iraqi exile communities worldwide will continue to grow.  
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